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ABSTRACT 
Author: Juan M. Gomez 
Title: Air Cargo as a Different Business Unit 
Institution: Embry Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Business Administration in Aviation 
Year: 2000 
By combining cargo and passenger operations under the same business, airlines 
are facing an operational conflict with respect to the cargo operation, which has always 
been perceived as a by-product and not as an essential revenue generating activity; This 
fact leads to poor product quality, weak revenues, and value deterioration. By dedicating 
time and resources to the cargo operation in a different business unit with a defined 
strategy, carriers may increase cargo profitability and achieve superior operational 
results. 
The purpose of this study is to identify and explain the benefits for passenger 
airlines to invest in air-cargo operations by defining a clear strategy and creating a 
separate business unit. Through developing a concept-based decision model the study 
explains why it makes sense to dedicate time and resources (invest) implementing a 
strategy for cargo operations. The outcome of this investigation will serve as a decision 
support tool for those airlines that are evaluating whether or not to invest in developing 
further their current cargo operations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Time is money. Today's fast paced environment is changing the way businesses 
are being done in many industries. Technology and innovation built in today's goods is 
shortening product life cycles and reducing time to market periods. These circumstances 
require transportation alternatives able to keep up with such accelerated environment and 
able to provide efficient logistic management. 
For several firms, the logistic management is today a decisive value adding activity, 
which demands reliable and accurate distribution solutions. The benefits in terms of time 
savings and reliability that air cargo provides are invaluable for certain industries 
specially for those involved in producing technologic goods or perishables. 
According to the World Trade Organization 1999 Annual Report, two of the 
major contributors of international trade during that year were the information technology 
sector and the automobile industry. One of the most dynamic branches of the global 
information technology industry in 1999 was mobile phones. Due to the nature of the 
mentioned products the preferred transportation alternative is by air (16% of total air 
cargo in 1998) and therefore any acceleration in the volume of production and sales for 
these, automatically represents an increase in the demand for air transportation services. 
In general, passenger airlines treat their cargo business as a by-product. Since 
their main stream of revenues comes from the passenger business the idea of investing 
and developing strategies to improve the performance of cargo operations is not well 
received. 
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Actual Air-Cargo practices implemented by many passenger airlines will not fit 
the changing market requirements in the near future and therefore a different approach in 
which the carrier becomes a logistic partner instead of being a single step in the value 
chain will be demanded. 
This study intends to emphasize the importance of air cargo for passenger airlines 
by explaining the characteristics of the business, describing its differences and 
similarities with the passenger operation, and providing an overview of promising world 
trends in terms of economic growth and international trade increase. In addition this study 
will serve as a decision support tool for those airlines facing the dilemma of whether or 
not to invest in cargo operations by presenting a decision tree model which provides three 
different alternatives to the problem. Five major airlines will serve as examples to 
illustrate the benefits of investing in developing a strategy for air cargo in a different 
business unit. 
Problem Statement 
By combining cargo and passenger operations under the same business, airlines 
are facing an operational conflict with respect to the cargo business, which is viewed as a 
by-product and not as an essential revenue generating activity; This circumstance leads to 
poor product quality, weak revenues, and value deterioration. 
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Review of Related Literature 
Thomas Poring. Dr. Tobias Farnv. Albrecht Crux, 1999. The Spin-Off of Cargo Business 
and Why it Makes Sense. The Handbook of Airline Finance - First Edition, pp. 263 - 276. 
This article is the basis or the explanation of why a company (airline) should spin-
off its cargo operations providing a clear overview of what is going on in the world today 
and why transportation by air is relevant now more than ever before. 
The study starts by stating that value management is the key to obtain better 
performance in a given company. In relation to the airline industry, says that each 
company must stop viewing the organization as a whole and identify value-adding 
activities instead in order to determine the contribution of each business unit. The basic 
premise is that if one is able to find value destructive or resource locking business units, 
there is no reason to keep that business in the portfolio; also reevaluates the validity of 
the multiple business portfolios as risk spreading strategies. 
With regard to customer requirements, there are six basic needs that the cargo 
industry has to fulfill: shorter time between manufacturer and retailer, special handling 
for sensitive (high value) products, global presence for logistic partners, optimization 
along the value chain, reduced number of suppliers, and a request for special services 
which leads to wider product portfolio. 
Cargo demands a different type of quality, and that's why passengers and cargo 
synergies do not exist. What is good for the passenger operation is not necessary good for 
cargo. Passengers fly roundtrip normally whereas cargo goes one way; quick turnaround 
times are needed while running a passenger operation (to meet minimum connecting 
times) but with cargo this fact becomes a restriction, and so on. 
While facing the cargo operation dilemma, an airline operator has three different 
options to choose from, (a) To enhance the cargo business operation to be able to 
compete and capture an attractive market share. As an airline, the bargain power is higher 
than the one of the freight forwarders. This strategy also implies that in order to provide a 
wide array of services and destinations, the company should form partnerships or 
alliances; even more, it is mentioned that the main factor influencing the success of the 
strategy is to find the right partners.(b) The second strategy is to go "all the way" with the 
cargo operation, which means to integrate all the different transportation steps into one; 
in other words, it is required that the airline provide the forwarding services as well as the 
in land transportation, which will give the customer a complete solution to its 
transportation needs, (c) The last strategy is the step-back; this implies that the airline is 
not willing to deal with cargo operations at all and therefore will sell all of its belly space 
to other airlines or to a freight forwarder. 
Concluding, the article gives five reasons why the air cargo spin-off creates value 
and should be implemented: (1) Portfolio optimization, which avoids cross subsidizing, 
allows for separation of results and helps reallocation of critical resources; (2) Market 
Inefficiencies, which imply "Pure Play" preferences, public exposure and take over 
fantasies; (3) Extinguish the corporate discount, which removes negative synergies and 
improves the make or buy structure; (4) Strategy Implementation, which sets individual 
strategic requirements and (5) Management Control and Efficiency that provides 
enhanced market knowledge, focuses on the customer and might benefit from corporate 
identity. 
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Nicolas Herrman. Dr. Detlef Trefzger and Albretch Crux (1998). Challenges for 
Tomorrow's Successful AirFreight Providers. Handbook of Airline Marketing - First 
Edition, pp.141 - 154. 
In order to have a better understanding of the factors influencing the Air Cargo 
services in the future it is necessary to take a look at issues like information technology 
advances, markets liberalization, economic globalization and product life cycles. 
This publication explains the main factors that have affected the market for 
transport and logistic services in the last ten years. As a result of technological advances 
in telecommunications, customers demand new products at a faster rate than ever before 
and therefore, the PLCs are being reduced every day. In addition, there is an increasing 
number of countries opening their doors for international trade and cooperation and thus 
expanding the size of the global market; New competitors in the market represent an 
other important factor, they enjoy lower barriers of entry with significant cost advantages. 
What the market is asking now is for "a value added logistic service rather than an 
air transport commodity"(142). That's the reason why some airlines are stuck in the 
middle of nowhere. In one hand the freight forwarders are developing their services to 
become valuable logistics partners for their customers, and on the other hand the 
integrators (FedEx, UPS, etc.) which are now showing some kind of interest in carrying 
higher weight levels. From every point of view these two players are providing a 
complete solution to their customers. Passenger carriers on the other hand, keep doing 
what has been done for years which consists on taking cargo from point A to point B. 
Logistics is more than just transport and that's why it is important to integrate the 
transportation solution and provide a complete service. The company with the know-how 
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with regard to the integration of transportation and information chain will reap the 
benefits. 
According to the findings of Roland Berger & Partners, six levers for successful 
strategic positioning in the changing air transport industry have been identified. (1) by 
creating independent business units for cargo, airlines will react faster and more 
effectively to market demands. (2) "Network management will increase service range and 
value added potential for airlines" (147). (3) By creating alliances or partnerships, win-
win situations among competitors will be generated. (4) By enhancing the service 
portfolios, airlines will be more appealing as industry partners. (5) "With a targeted 
business and sales approach, airlines will create high quality revenues" (147). (6) In order 
to control the integration and the effectiveness of the operation, information technology 
has to support the corporation and will become a key competency. 
It is recommended that airlines create independent business units for cargo 
operations. Many airlines derive most of the profits from the cargo operation and 
therefore such business has to be considered not as a by-product but as an important 
revenue contributor. Passengers and cargo have different requirements for optimal 
operation, not only because of the nature of the product but because with cargo there are 
special handling requirements, specific timeframes, order management etc. To get 
strategic positioning in the market, aligned strategic planning and enjoy from specially 
trained sales force, the cargo business has to be separated as a different unit. The 
advantages of doing this are: (1) Accelerates decision making, (2) Influences the 
organizational behavior toward more flexibility, (3) More know-how is acquired and is 
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transferred to the business operation and (4) the organizational hierarchy structure gets 
flattened. 
Sandra Vandermerwe (1997) Increasing Returns: Competing for Customers in the Global 
Market. Journal of World Business #32 Vol. (4) p.333-348 
As airlines compete fiercely in a commoditized market, those who are able to 
come up with innovative ways to provide value adding services and one-stop solutions 
will be the ones prevailing in the battle. This article exemplifies how businesses may shift 
from diminishing returns to increasing returns by redesigning strategies. 
The starting point of this study is the diminishing returns theory, which states that 
at certain point of production, putting more resources will eventually produce less output. 
The increasing returns theory is based on several management premises which differ 
from the ones the diminishing returns theory is based on, radically. The shift from short 
term financials to long term corporate and market growth implies that companies have 
struggled in the past to show short term financial improvements through manufacturing 
efficiencies, and economies of scale but the market has almost always supported products 
and services which best suited customers needs. 
From achieving long term financial by margins on single transactions, to achieve 
long term corporate and market growth by the time value of customers. Under the 
increasing returns theory, the new enterprise looks at the potential of life long customer 
value and evaluates its benefits, instead of focusing in individual transactions and its 
margins. There is a point at which the diminishing returns stop to become increasing 
returns. This point which is called the acceleration point is the consequence of having a 
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loyal base of repetitive customers which are less expensive to serve up and satisfy than 
new customers which are expensive to attract and to keep. As the company expands its 
base of loyal customers the resources needed for attracting new ones are less every time, 
which leads to increasing returns. 
From getting market share in discrete product/market categories, to get as much 
share of opportunity in dynamic market spaces from individual customers. Is necessary to 
recognize that customers no longer buy products or services on a transaction basis. 
Customers buy results; they want solutions and that's what they are willing to pay for. As 
corporations provide an integrated experience and craft strategies to get as much share of 
the new opportunities, two effects might take place: (1) customers get locked not to 
individual products but to an entire system, which is what corporations look for and (2) 
corporations provide a wide range of value added services, where returns are normally 
higher. When companies are able to shift from individual product/market emphasis to 
total customer experience categories, then, the shares are no longer in things but in a 
company's mission which brings a new direction to resources allocation, objectives and 
priorities. As a consequence the company will achieve the results customers want and this 
fact will bring them back again and again. 
The study mentions the case of Virgin Atlantic, which is providing its customers 
with a complete solution to their transportation needs and therefore the company operates 
limousine, shuttle and trains to match the ground transportation with their airline 
operation making it almost in a seamless way. Once in the terminal they feature "Club 
Houses" with all kind of amenities to make a trip pleasant even between flights. 
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The last premise states that it is necessary to jump from value based on discrete 
tangibles, to intangibles, which constantly accumulate, that add the value. Companies 
with knowledge about its customers and with know-how are more likely to enjoy 
increasing returns. By having both of the mentioned elements, a company should be able 
to come up with products and services to suit the needs of new customers and to improve 
the existing ones to keep the actual market share. 
Stephen Hollowav. (1997). Straight and Level Practical Airline Economics. The basic 
economics of supply, p.22-192 
This chapter explains the benefits that air freight operations bring to passenger 
airlines from the economic point of view. 
Airline operators take advantage of economics of scope by offering their aircraft's 
belly space for freight transportation. When a company sells different products on the 
same departing aircraft that is considered as economies of scope. The benefits obtained 
from cross utilization of resources are present from a marketing perspective too. The fact 
that a company that has invested in a corporate image and a brand name use them to 
promote additional products is perfectly valid. By advertising multiple products under the 
umbrella of a well known brand name may lower marketing costs, and thus "the more 
markets over which an airline operates or the largest its product range and network, the 
greater are its opportunities to spread joint and common costs" 
Virgin Atlantic is an example of how a brand name can be exploited to sponsor 
products that other wise won't be as appealing. The Virgin brand sells for itself and when 
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the company advertises a soda, a radio station or a train service, automatically all the 
other products are being advertised because the lie under the same brand umbrella. 
Michael Porter. (1980) Competitive Strategy - Techniques for Analyzing Industries and 
Competitors. 
Business unit performance might be enhanced when managers are able to align 
corporate business strategies with the ones of the independent business units. According 
to Michael Porter7 s Competitive Strategy Book, the nature of a sustainable competitive 
advantage is the essence of strategy. There are two basic strategies to choose from; the 
first one states that the company could become the lowest cost provider (cost leadership) 
or on the other hand, can adopt a differentiation strategy and then a premium price could 
be charged. The ideal point is to be in the middle where both low cost and differentiation 
met. The following are some important business activities by generic strategy. (1) Factor 
Inputs: Under the cost leadership strategy, they are low cost raw materials, labor 
productivity and capital to sustain necessary investment; under the differentiation 
strategy, factor inputs are represented by product technology, creativity and innovation. 
(2) Processing: With the cost leadership strategy they are efficient scale facilities, 
process engineering skills, minimal waste, logistics and employee productivity; under the 
differentiation strategy they are flexibility and quality. (3) Product or Service: under 
cost leadership they are represented by ease of manufacturing and capital intensity; for 
the differentiated they are technical service, styling uniqueness, options, quality and 
reliability, image and product variations. There are also allied services for the 
differentiated strategy such as availability / delivery, guarantees, financing, market 
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research and new ideas for improved use. (4) Distribution: for cost leaders there must be 
an efficient scale of customers, a simple product line and price discrimination; for 
differentiated strategies, there must be credit, sales support and post purchase service. 
A study was conducted in sixty-nine different companies with different strategies 
in terms of cost and differentiation. Those companies that implemented a pure 
differentiation strategy achieved the best performance, in terms of sales growth. Those 
businesses that managed to have both cost and differentiation advantages obtained the 
highest return on investment (ROI). The focus of the study was on the relationship 
between business units and the rest of the firm. 
From the risk point of view, cost leadership strategies are less uncertain than the 
differentiation ones. The fact that cost issues are commonly internal to the firm and the 
companies know their processes very well, make the outcomes and the steps for 
implementing this kind of strategy somehow predictable. On the other hand, with 
differentiation strategies, which normally deal with customer preferences and 
complexities, the degree of uncertainty is very high since most of the influencing factors 
are external to the firm. 
As a conclusion the author states that pure strategies may allow a more focused 
organizational effort directed toward reducing cost or finding uniqueness. Achieving both 
of these outcomes implies a more complex management task. The character of each 
business strategy should serve as a condition for the design of the firm's organizational 
context. 
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Alan H. Stratford (1973), Air Cargo Operational and Economic Problems, Air Transport 
Economics in the Supersonic Era Second Edition, p.213 - 254 
The cargo chapter of this book illustrates the advantages of air cargo 
transportation and why should be managed independently from the passenger business 
due to its growth potential and increasing all-cargo aircraft availability. 
The author explicitly points out that the increasing volume of air cargo movement 
is an incentive to operate a separate all-cargo aircraft to provide the necessary space and 
capacity that the market will demand. The author refers a lecture given in 1962 by 
professor Crocco who said that air cargo transport cannot develop in proportion to its tme 
prospects unless differentiated at every stage and in every way, from the passenger side 
of business. Is clear that passenger and cargo operations require different infrastmcture in 
terms of docks, personnel, equipment and processes in general. The optimistic forecasts 
of freight movement by air foster the creation of all-cargo divisions among passenger 
carriers or companies created exclusively to cater this demand. 
Airfreight has become a factor that influences the economics of production in a 
powerful manner. Issues like speed, reliability, effectiveness and dependability makes air 
cargo a key to success for a wide variety of products. The following is a list of the kind of 
goods that are preferably transported by air. 
• Perishable goods (Food, Flowers, etc.) 
• Economic perishable goods (Magazines, newspapers, fashion items, etc.) 
• High value to volume ratio goods. (Appliances, Electronic equipment, etc.) 
• Goods that require expensive and complicated packaging if shipped by transportation 
means other than air. 
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• Equipment that is delicate and susceptible to damage like Television units, radios and 
electronic devices, etc.) 
• Items that might otherwise not be possible to deliver at all. 
The author concludes that as a result of the availability of newer larger aircraft, 
cheaper to operate the prices for airfreight will go down. This fact in addition with 
improved airline operational techniques and scientific marketing will lead to an 
expansion and growth of the amount of goods transported by air. 
World Air Cargo Forecast. Boeing Company Release (1998-1999) 
This document exposes Boeing's perspective for world air cargo in terms of 
merchandise flow, all-cargo aircraft demand and overall economic issues that affect the 
cargo business. 
There is a yield-profit squeeze trend. Cargo yields has been declining since 1970, 
then leveled off and began to move upward during 1993, but in 1997 a reversal occurred 
as increases in capacity and traffic imbalances (as a consequence of the Asian crisis) 
affected the industry. 
There is a pattern of growth for the express packages market. Just in the U.S. this 
category averages 25% growth per year. Today airfreight is an integral element of the 
distribution channel. 
The integrators' (UPS, FedEx, DHL, etc.) market share is increasing and they are 
redefining their business to fit their customers needs. Today they are not considered as 
freight carriers but as third-party logistics providers and enterprise resource planing 
companies (ERP). 
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Other participants in the airfreight market such as freight forwarders and 
combination carriers have not realized the magnitude of the integrator phenomena and the 
threat they represent to their market share. If airlines providing cargo services and freight 
forwarders don't provide a level of service comparable to that of the integrators they will 
loose a big portion of the cake. 
The forecast for airfreight by major markets is specified below: 
• World 10.5% 
• North America 6.8% 
• Europe - North America 10.3% 
• Asia - North America 12.3% 
• North America - Latin America 7.9% 
• Europe - Asia 10.2% 
• Intra Asia 7.0% 
Boeing's forecast for all-cargo fleet requirements reveal that over 70% of the 
future fleet will consist of modified aircraft and over a 20 year period, the projected 
requirement is for 650 new freighters. 
Douglas W. Nelms, Holistic Cargo Air Transport World 9/99, p88 - 89. 
This article exposes British Airways efforts to push the cargo business by creating 
a different business unit called "World Cargo". On October 12,1992 British Airways 
Cargo became British Airways World Cargo, a new business unit with a new brand name 
intended to push BA's worldwide cargo operations. The company's objective with this 
move was to increase the product quality in terms of accuracy of delivery, and capacity. 
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The company just received a huge new cargo center and that, along with new 
employees, a re-trained workforce, revised processes and lots of input from customers 
represents the commitment of the company to provide a top quality air cargo service. 
Lufthansa Cargo: Thinking in new directions, www.lhcargo.com. 
This publication illustrates Lufthansa's achievements in providing all-cargo 
services and explains the different products offered and the Time Definite Service 
concept. The company's belief about air cargo services is that in the near future the 
survivors will be those companies offering integrated systems. In order to address this 
necessity, Lufthansa entered into a complete new form of cooperation with freight 
forwarders and other airlines. According to the firm, the prerequisite for a successful 
integration between airlines and forwarders is the "seamless blending of their services". 
Lufthansa created the concept of Time Definite Services which consist of a time 
frame in which the company is committed to deliver the merchandise to the customs 
authority (when applicable) at the destination point so the customer can count on high 
levels of certainty. The advantage of this concept is that the merchandise is not attached 
to a flight number or an itinerary but to a commitment in time. With this in mind, it 
doesn't matter if the cargo flies east or west, or if it goes to one end of the world and back 
as long as that time requisite is achieved. That's the whole idea and the results are 
showing. If the company is unable to meet the time estimation, the service is free of 
charge. 
To achieve the levels of service Lufthansa has reached, it is necessary to have 
business partners capable enough to maintain a reliability and product quality 
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commitment. Today, Varig, United, SAS and Thai (through the Star Alliance) are sharing 
the benefits of this new concept in the cargo business. 
Douglas W. Nelms. Getting Together - Air Transport World, March 1999. 
Lufthansa's partnership program with freight forwarders and the consolidation of 
the Time Definite Service constitutes an important step in the firm's migration from a 
transport company to a provider of integrated logistics services. This fact explains why 
being a simple player in the transportation chain does not add as much value as if the 
complete logistic solution (one stop solution) is provided. 
There is a worldwide trend towards business integration and to eliminate steps 
and intermediaries which do not add value to the product. Companies are looking at 
different ways to reduce the number of players they do business with. In the particular 
case of Lufthansa, the Business Partnership Program was designed to enhance the 
cooperation among the players in the industry and to eliminate valueless tasks and 
procedures while improving the service quality. The company started this program in 
January of 1998 and 10 forwarders have joined the partnership so far. According with a 
Lufthansa's Cargo Executive Board, Stefan Lauer, companies will need to offer 
integrated services if they are to survive future competition. One of the most critical 
factors in the partnership program is the tmst members have placed in each other. 
Another major factor is the coordination between companies. Each company belonging to 
the partnership has a Lufthansa's management team dedicated to it. 
By implementing this program the business has grown 9% whereas the regular 
business (through agents) has remained constant. 
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Satish Jindel, Delivering E-Commerce, Air Cargo World, March 1999, p.24-26 
The Internet era is changing the consumers' purchasing habits, connecting them 
directly to the manufacturer and this fact is impacting several industries, one of those is 
the transportation industry. 
The ability the Internet is giving consumers to by-pass retailers is transforming 
the way the businesses are being done. The internet will give consumers and small 
business operators in general the opportunity to create "virtual just-in-time" delivery 
systems and to eliminate the non-value added handling and transportation costs. Large 
shipments from manufacturers to a retailer or intermediary are being replaced by small 
and more frequent direct deliveries to final consumers. The implications of a more direct 
distribution channel for the transportation industry are: 
• Cycle time for getting the products is reduced which will eliminate additional 
handling and transportation of freight by wholesalers and retailers. 
• By the elimination of an important percentage of mark-up due a more direct 
distribution channel, there will be an increase in sales volume. 
• Provide additional revenue to manufacturers to cover increased transportation costs of 
smaller and more frequent shipments to consumers. 
• There will be better margins for the manufacturers by having a direct contact with 
consumers and they will be able to push more rapid improvements in the products. 
Companies offering logistic solutions with global scope are the ones called to 
benefit from these changes in the marketplace. 
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Beth M. Schwartz, Air Cargo Make Over, Transportation & Distribution: Cleveland, 
February 1999, p. 67-72 
This article gives an overall review of the air cargo importance for passenger 
carriers and the trends of the business in the near future. 
From the 100% of cargo transported by air, only 15% is transported by all-cargo 
carriers, 8% by integrated carriers like FedEx or DHL, and passenger airlines account for 
77%. 55% travels on the belly of passenger aircraft and the rest in dedicated freighters 
leased or owned by the passenger carriers. These figures reveal the importance of air 
cargo for regular passenger carriers, which still see this as a by-product. Some companies 
leverage the operation through passenger traffic only, and cargo represents extra profits 
and not a source of sustainable revenues and business growth. 
According to the Boeing Company's World Cargo Forecast, the percentage of 
growth for the air freight business is higher than the one for passengers. Nevertheless, 
airlines are still stuck in providing a pure transportation service with little value adding. 
Even worse, some airlines are reluctant to invest in cargo operations. According to the 
article, Cargo's secondary status and the passenger airlines' control of capacity may 
change as carriers try to keep pace with projected airfreight industry growth. 
A possible problem arising in the horizon is the imminent shortage of new cargo 
aircraft and the availability of used or converted ones. If the projections are accurate there 
will be a need of about 2,200 additional aircraft from which three fourths will be 
conversions. Moreover, The Boeing Company launched a new business unit to take care 
of passenger aircraft conversions to freighters. 
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Andrew Tanzer, Warehouse that Fly. Forbes Magazine. October 18, 1999. p. 120 -124 
This article illustrates the potential for air cargo carriers as the world moves to a 
more fashion-like economy in which products are highly technological and perishable. 
Federal Express, DHL, TNT, and other integrators are enjoying a new way of 
doing business, as many of the latest technology related products become quickly 
perishable and obsolete. Nowadays products are very alike in terms of design and 
specifications, therefore manufacturers compete less in product and quality and more on 
inventory turns and speed to the market. 
The potential for airfreight in the future is promising. Integration is needed to 
provide a logistic solution and large investments in information technology are going to 
be demanded. 
Today, express carriers are less just carriers but business partners that help 
manufacturers to accomplish global resource mobility. 
Toby B. Gooley, Airfreight: Watching the Clock. Logistics Management and Distribution 
Report, July 1998, p.46-47 
The market for air-cargo services it's changing now more than ever and those able 
to satisfy customers providing the right service will reap the benefits of the business 
transformation. 
One thing shippers demand the most is time definite delivery. Customers are 
getting used to the efficiency and reliability of express services provided by integrated 
carriers and now they want the same quality level in their heavyweight shipments. 
20 
Although Federal Express has introduced its level of service in the heavy airfreight 
market, airlines and forwarders are still lagging behind. 
Concerned with the mentioned issue, the International Air Transport Association 
(I AT A) launched the Cargo 2000 project which pretends to enable airlines and 
forwarders to offer reliable time-definite services that can compete with the express 
carriers' product. 
Lufthansa launched in 1998 the Time Definite Cargo Service (already mentioned 
in this literature review) intended to achieve shorter transit times, greater accuracy, and 
guaranteed access to capacity. The firm's concept is to meet the timing needs of the 
shipper's merchandise and not the opposite. 
The hurdles arising for this new concept are government regulations in terms of 
security, customs and noise abatement procedures that prohibit night operations. 
Ian Putzger. Fledgling Stays the Course, The Journal of Commerce, March 1998. 
This article reveals the importance of Air Cargo business for United Airlines, 
which made them decide to operate All-Cargo aircraft and expand its market horizons. 
Entering in the All-Cargo business for United Airlines represents a big step for 
the carrier. By the date of the article the airline employed four DC-10 freighters to link 
Los Angeles, San Francisco and Chicago with some Asian capitals. 
For right now, United is not planning to expand the operation in the short-term, as 
they want to consolidate and see market trends. After analyzing the Cargo Business 
arena they can take a next step in bringing bigger aircraft and serving more destinations. 
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By the year 2000 the airline plans to modify its fleet to allow for more belly space 
in the most demanded destinations and thus, flights to the Pacific will be served by 747-
400s, Europe by 777 and Latin America by a combination of 777 and 767-300s. In 
addition Jim Hartigan, United's Vice-president of cargo said that by the year 2010 there 
will be clusters of companies working together to provide integral solutions. 
Statement of Hypothesis 
Passenger airlines that implement a defined strategy for the cargo operation under 
a different business unit derive higher revenues from that operation as compared to those 
airlines mixing both passenger and cargo operations with a single strategy, not suited for 
different business needs. 
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2. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 
In almost every industry corporations compete against each other to produce 
above average returns and to maximize shareholder's value and that is why multiple 
types of organizational strategies are developed. The main purpose of organizing is to 
move toward the attainment of organizational objectives, and the stmctural design should 
facilitate this purpose (McCarthy, Minichiello, and Curran Business Policy and Strategy 
1975). The fact that the organizational structure has a significant impact on a 
corporation's performance demonstrates that depending on the type and/or size of a 
business, there are desirable ways to constitute a company. 
As companies grow, and markets expand there is a general tendency for 
corporations to diversify and expand product scope. In the same way, as a consequence of 
growth the larger the volume of work and the more varied the activities involved, also the 
larger and more complex becomes the job of getting things done.* One of the major 
shortcomings of large diversified corporations is the internal conflict between different 
departments each one of these fighting for scarce resources to achieve independent goals. 
Some companies are successful managing multiple business units encouraging them to 
achieve individual goals whom at the same time are able to attain overall corporate goals. 
Even in large-scale corporations, with appropriate resources, technologies and 
information systems, top managers can redistribute the assets to maximize value. 
1
 McCarthy, Minichiello, and Curran (1975) "Business Policy and Strategy" L.L.Cummings and E. Kirby 
Warren), pp. 353. 
In some cases, failing or emerging companies attempt to duplicate leading 
corporations' stmctures and processes, but even if a company's organization looks simple 
enough to be copied, it might not work in the firm adopting it. The reason behind this is 
that there are "invisible hands" in the regular operations of a company. Elements like 
corporate culture and tacit processes or policies are complex to identify and imitate, and 
only when they are combined with the proper company structure produce satisfactory 
results. 
2.1 The Value Chain Concept 
According to Michael Porter, every business receives resources, transforms them 
and sends them as outputs to the customer2. This concept defines the value chain and 
each of the processes or activities in such chain add value to the output. Consequently, 
because each activity on the value chain affects the company's performance (Costs and 
profits), the decisions about each activity on it would determine the nature and quality of 
the output. Porter classified the activities necessary to convert the inputs in outputs as 
either primary or supporting activities. 
The Primary activities in the value chain include: 
• Inbound Logistics: This activity refers to the relationships with suppliers and all 
the logistics involved in receiving materials and supplies. In addition it has to do 
with the way the inputs are distributed. Particularly, this activity includes vehicle 
2
 Porter M.E., Competitive Strategy (1980) "Techniques for analyzing industries and competitors" Free 
Press, New York 
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scheduling, materials handling, inventory management and warehousing 
management. 
• Production: Is the activity by which inputs are transformed into outputs. In a 
manufacturing company it will include all the processes that a product goes 
through until it is ready for distribution. In a service providing company such as 
an airline it involves all the steps that a passenger (or cargo) follows in order to 
reach its destination. 
• Outbound Logistics: This activity is mainly the distribution process or delivering 
the output to the customer. In airlines it may consist of an Internet website, a 
travel (cargo) agent, the counter at the airport (front desk at the cargo warehouse) 
or a discount ticket retailer. 
• Marketing and sales: Consist of making customers aware of the product or 
service. Also is intended to induce them to buy and make it easy to acquire the 
product. Other components are promotions, price strategies, advertising and 
distribution. 
• Service: Consist of all the activities intended to keep the product working or 
delivering satisfaction after the sale is made. In a service provider company it may 
include guarantees, refunds, information services, education, etc. 
Depending on the level of proficiency of a company in one or more of these 
activities it is possible to develop competitive advantages. Companies like Southwest are 
strong at the production activities achieving quick turn around times for their flights and 
offering a consistent and reliable low priced product. 
25 
The Support activities are the ones intended to service the primary activities of the 
value chain. 
• Procurement: Is the process of acquiring resources for the primary activities. 
• Human Resources Management: includes recmiting, selecting evaluating, 
training, developing, rewarding and dismissing personnel. Since corporations are 
about people, the level of motivation, skill and satisfaction could be reflected 
somehow in the overall company's performance. 
• Technology Development: since almost all the activities in our companies 
nowadays involve some kind of technology or know how, this support activity 
represents the backbone of many succeeding corporations. In the case of large 
corporations, information systems and communications technologies are essential 
technologies to prevail. 
• Management Systems: These are functional areas or departments that make 
possible for the company to operate and hold the business together. 
2.2 Value Chain Analysis 
The value chain analysis represents a powerful tool to detect those activities that 
are contributing in a positive way to the outputs of a corporation. At the same time it 
enables managers to scrutinize those activities that either destroy or do not add any value 
to the output and thus they should be revised and modified. In some cases it is possible to 
find activities that have no contribution in terms of value, but are necessary for the 
manufacturing or service final output. According to Doring, Famy and Crux3, when 
3
 Thomas Doring, Dr. Tobias Farny, Albrecht Crux (1996) 'The Handbook of Airline Economics" Chp. 19 
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thinking in terms of value management an airline must not view the organization as a 
whole entity but rather focus on the contribution of each business unit. In addition if a 
business unit is found to be value destmctive or locking up resources that could be use to 
generate more value otherwise, no valid reason exists to keep the unit in the company's 
portfolio. 
The following are common business units that are considered as value adding 
activities in some airlines: 
• Maintenance Services: Several airlines around the world perform their own 
maintenance. In order to keep the fleet flying safely a series of scheduled 
maintenance services are required by either the manufacturer or the operator. Due to 
the amount of the investment to mn an airliner maintenance facility and the cost of 
qualified personnel, tools and supplies, only a few large operators are able to provide 
this service and thus profit from it. By offering to other airlines scheduled and non-
scheduled maintenance services, the operator of a maintenance facility optimize asset 
utilization and generate additional value to the organization. Companies like United 
Airlines, Swiss Air and Lufthansa are clear examples of these practices. 
• Crew Training Services: Similarly to the maintenance services the training of crew 
members is expensive and the required infrastmcture to train new pilots, perform 
transitions and keep them current demands enormous investments. Again, large 
airline operators have developed their own training facilities and are also able to 
provide with the service to other companies. This practice generates additional value 
by utilizing optimizing asset utilization. There are several examples of this popular 
practice such as the United Airlines Training Center or the American Airlines 
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Training facility, both of this companies sell simulation time to other airline's crews 
many of them from abroad 
• Catenng Some airlines have developed expertise in the preparation of on-board 
menus and have designed and implemented efficient networks of ground services, 
which are present in many countries of the world Lufthansa's Sky Chefs is a clear 
example of this business practice 
• Distribution Services Through Computer Reservation Systems (CRS) and other 
developments in Information Technology several airlines have profited by providing 
others with the service of accessibility to seat inventory American Airlines' SABRE 
(Semi Automatic Business Research Environment) and United Airlines'4 Apollo are 
the dominants in the United states market5 
• Air Cargo Some airlines deal with airfreight as a different business unit thus profiting 
from it by developing a product that is suited to meet customer needs who far from a 
transportation service wants a logistic partner This particular activity is the main purpose 
of this study 
In their study, The Spin-off of Cargo Operations, Donng, Farny, and Crux6 refer to 
the three tools of value management and suggest that airlines in general have failed to 
address one of the most important aspects of value management, which is the Portfolio 
Management Figure 1 explains the above statement 
4
 Along with US Airways, Air Canada, KLM, Swiss Air, British Airways and Alitalia 
^ Paul S Dempsey (1997) "Airline Management Strategies for the 21 century" Coast Aire Publications 
6
 Thomas Donng, Dr Tobias Farny, Albrecht Crux (1996) "The Handbook of Airline Economics" Chp 19 
Figure 1 Three Tools of Value Management 
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Porfblio Management Tool Operative control Tool 
Portfolio Evaluation 
Internal Allocation of 
Financial Resources 
Evaluation/Definition of 
Financing strategies 
Derivation of concrete, operative 
measures to increase value. 
Evaluation of alternative investment 
projects. 
"Objective" hurdle rate for 
performance efficiency and 
VALUE MANAGEMENT | 
Externally, for target 
group-orientated 
presentation of 
performance efficiency. 
Internally, For 
communication of 
targets and expectations 
Communication Tool 
From the study stand point, those business units in the portfolio that are value 
destmctive or locking should be either transformed or separated. 
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3. AIR CARGO BUSINESS CHARACTERISTICS 
3.1 Demand Characteristics 
Historically speaking, the air cargo business has shown a tendency to correlate 
with the world's GDP. The GDP represents the sum of the country's Gross Domestic 
Product (output of goods and services) and it is a good indicator of the world's economic 
activity. When the GDP is compared with the behavior of the overall air cargo RTKs 
(Revenue Ton Kilometers) the relationship between the two indicators can be seen in 
Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2 
Wor ld Economic Growth and Internat ional Air Freight Traffic Growth 
19B2 1933 1984 19S5 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 199C 1997 1S98 
World Freight Traffic Growth " • 'OECD GDP Growth 
Figure 2 Correlation between GDP and RTK's 
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According to a Boeing's Forecast in October of 19967, the average annual growth 
in world air cargo would average 6.4 percent through the year 2017, however some 
regional indicators would average as much as 8 to 9 percent. The markets with the most 
significant growth rates would be Intra-Asia and North America - Asia. 
The mentioned growth trend is driven by a series of factors that will be explained 
later in this study. Generalizing, the value of speed gives air cargo an advantage over all 
other transportation alternatives; consequently several products are preferably shipped by 
air due to their short life (perishables), high cost to volume relation, necessity or 
convenience. Because the value of certain goods depends upon their condition on 
reaching the market, the speed provided by air transportation becomes the most suitable 
alternative for hundreds of products8. Even though freight charges by air are more 
expensive than those of other surface transportation alternatives, the savings in multiple 
aspects like warehousing, time to market or system efficiency justify them. 
The value of speed increases as the value of time increases9 This is why day after 
day more products are shipped by air, generating a steady demand for the service 
however for a manufacturer, the decision on whether to ship by air or not depends on 
several factors with respect to the product characteristics. The following are some of the 
most important considerations that manufacturers take in order to decide transportation 
by air. 
• Perishable nature of the product: This is common in fresh fish, fruits, flowers and 
fashion sensitive goods. 
7
 Boeing (1996), "Air cargo - world overview and forecast" Boeing Publications 
8
 Stratford Alan H. (1973) "Air transport economics in the supersonic era" Macmillan ST. Martin's Press 
9
 Idem 
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• Value of the goods: Some products are worth to be shipped by air because of their 
high cost to volume ratio. Pacemakers, cellular phones and other hi-tech items are 
normally shipped by air to avoid pilferage, damage or delays normally found in other 
transportation alternatives. In addition, the cost of storing this kind of goods in 
inventory is relatively high. 
• Packaging Considerations: To avoid damages, deterioration or pilferage, sensitive 
merchandise is packed in special containers, which make the manufacturer/shipper 
incur in additional expenses. When shipping by air, packaging requirements are less 
demanding thus balancing against more expensive freight charges. Items such as 
computer parts, automobile spare parts and aircraft components are normally shipped 
by air for this reason. 
• Insurance Charges: Because the risk involved when shipping by air is lower than 
ground or sea transportation, insurance rates are lower. For high valued items 
insurance costs could make a difference when choosing among transportation 
alternatives. 
• Market expansion needs: In some cases the markets may be expanded by the 
availability of air transportation. Air transport puts at reach or expands the range for 
many products. Countries like Colombia make extensive use of air transportation to 
ship flowers and bananas to the United States and several European markets. 
• Delivery might otherwise not be possible: In the case of music stars' world tours 
(taking place in countries scattered around the globe), the tight schedule between 
presentations and the vast amount of equipment that has to be moved cannot be 
transported by other means other than air. 
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• Costs: The cost to deliver by traditional means could be more expensive than by air. 
In the case of supplies shipped to Alaska or the Antarctic Region of Chile, air 
transportation is the preferred alternative. 
• Reliability and quality of service: According to Peter S. Smith in Airfreight 
Operations, Economics and Marketing, "there is a considerable body of evidence that 
one of the greatest problems associated with transport is the absence of consistency" 
It was found that the transit times have an important impact in the overall service 
reliability. Because airfreight transit times are considerably shorter, it is assumed to 
be more reliable10 
Other specific characteristics of the cargo business are: 
• Directionality: Unlike airline passengers who normally fly round trip, air cargo flies 
one way11 
• Seasonal Fluctuations: This behavior is typical of products with seasonal demand 
such as flowers, fruits or fashion items. This behavior generally does not coincide 
with the passenger high season periods. 
10
 Smith Peter M (1974) "Air Freight Operations. Economics and Marketing" Chp 6 Faber and Faber 
Limited 
11
 Smith Peter M. (1974) "Air Freight Operations. Economics and Marketing" Chp 5. Faber and Faber 
Limited 
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• Route structure: Air cargo is not as concerned of number of stops, route design or turn 
around times as the passenger side of the operation. 
• Type of customer: Freight forwarders, manufacturing corporations and mail agencies 
are the most common customers of air cargo carriers and thus it is a business to 
business relation. When dealing with passengers, it is a direct relationship that 
demands different a different level of service and resources. 
INTERNATIONAL AIR ORIENTED SHIPPERS BY 
INDUSTRY - 1998 
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Figure 3 Goods Shipped Preferably by Air 
3.2 Supply Characteristics 
There are several types of players in the air cargo transportation business. 
Scheduled passenger carriers move the majority of the freight worldwide. Charter 
freighters followed by mail contractors comprise the second largest group. 
Figures 4 and 5 show the evolution of Available-Ton-Kilometers ATKs, which 
represents the air cargo capacity supply12 
12
 Hatton Rick (1999) "Complexities of Air Cargo vis-a-vis Air Finance'7, The Handbook of airline finance 
Chp 38, McGraw Hill 
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Figure 5 Distribution of Airfreight in 2015 
It is forecasted that the combi aircraft operations as well as the cargo carried on 
scheduled passenger aircraft will decrease in about 5% each. The 10 percent is then 
gained by freighters whose operation is expected to grow from 34% to 44%. 
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According to the Boeing's 1999 World Air Cargo Forecast, the world's jet 
freighter fleet will double by the year 2017, with additional 1000 airplanes. 
1997 2017 
1
 r434 freighters 2,706 freighters 
Figure 6 World's Jet Freighter Fleet Forecast13 
The mentioned fleet growth is supported by growth in both the amount of cargo 
carried and the proportion of cargo carried by freighter aircrafts. Even though the demand 
for cargo aircraft is expected grow, there are still large amounts of used, low-priced 
aircraft suitable for cargo conversions. According to Boeing's predictions, 70 percent of 
the large freighters (wide body, all cargo aircraft) added in the next twenty years will 
come from converted aircraft14. On the other hand, the medium capacity, standard-body 
freighter fleet, will decrease by 65 airplanes in the same period. 
13
 Boeing (1999) "World Air Cargo Forecast" The Boeing Company", commercial division 
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Today only three aircraft manufacturers are capable of offering new freighter 
aircraft to the market. Boeing with the MD1 IF, 757-200,767-300F and 747-400F 
models; Airbus offers the A-300 and A300-600 (Beluga) and Antonov with its AN 124. 
These companies also have aircraft "combi" configurations to add flexibility to the fleet. 
Multiple independent companies offer passenger to cargo aircraft conversions. The 
advantages associated with this type of aircraft are that their initial price is very low as 
compared with new ones, airlines may already have staff trained in that type of aircraft 
and even spare parts in inventory. There are also disadvantages; since many civilian 
aeronautic agencies are demanding compliance with more restrictive pollution and noise 
regulations, and since a large proportion of the freighter take offs and landings occur 
during night hours it is necessary to convert the old fleet to meet modern standards. This 
normally implies to re-engine or modify non-compliant equipment thus increasing the 
cost of the operation. 
14
 Hatton Rick (1999) "Complexities of Air Cargo vis-a-vis Air Finance" , The Handbook of airline finance 
Chp 38, McGraw Hill 
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As of 1998 the world's freighter aircraft fleet was composed of 476 aircraft as 
shown in the table below. 
Table 1 Wide Body Freighter Aircraft Fleet by Type / Variant as of March 199815. 
Aircraft Type 
747-100F 
747-20 C / F 
747-200 SF 
747-400F 
767-300F 
A300-600 
A300-C4 / F4 
A310-200F/220F 
AN-124 
DC10-10F 
DC10-30AF/CF 
MD11F 
L1011F 
Total 
Number 
49 
83 
49 
20 
23 
28 
27 
37 
48 
15 
45 
41 
11 
476 
Status 
All converted from passenger to freighter 
Built new as freighters or convertibles 
All converted from combi or passengers 
Built new as freighters 
Built new as freighters 
Built new as freighters (3 Belugas) 
23 converted, and 4 built new as freighters 
All converted from passenger to freighter 
Built new as freighters 
8 Built new as freighters, 7 converted 
25 Built new as freighters, or convertible 
Freighter; 20 converted from passenger 
31 built new as freighters, 10 converted 
All converted from passenger. 
270 built new as freighters, 206 converted 
IATA's rankings for Scheduled Freight-Tonne-Kilometers (SFTK) flown 
represent the air cargo transported in the belly of passenger aircrafts worldwide. I 
mentioned earlier that the majority of the airfreight (59% in 1995) is carried in regular 
airliners and thus the importance of this statistics. The following chart shows the top 12 
airlines in terms of cargo STK's according to LATA, divided in domestic and 
international operations16. 
15
 Hatton Rick (1999) "The economics of wide-bodv freighter aircraft" The Handbook of airline finance, 
McGraw Hill 
16
 IATA (1995-1999) "World Air Transport Statistics WATS" IATA Publications 
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Table 2 Top 12 airlines in terms of cargo SFTK's (Scheduled Freight Tone Kilometer) 
TOTAL (DOMESTIC + INTERNATIONAL) - In millions of SFTK's 
Total 
Federal Express 
Lufthansa 
Korean Airlines 
Air France 
Singapore Airlines 
Japan Airlines 
KLM 
British Airways 
Cathay Pacific 
United Airlines 
Northwest Airlines 
American Airlines 
Source IATA (1995-19 
1994 
6,437 
5,373 
3,859 
4,226 
3,291 
3,592 
3,636 
3,110 
2,375 
2,328 
2,943 
2,303 
99r'WorldAir 
1995 
6,983 
5,833 
4,305 
4,420 
3,666 
3,781 
3,612 
3,253 
2,790 
2,464 
2,839 
2,403 
Transport 
1996 
7,813 
6,019 
4,819 
4,656 
4,116 
3,889 
3,780 
3,495 
3,180 
2,607 
2,789 
2,361 
Statistics WATS" 
1997 
9,014 
6,164 
5,643 
4,905 
4,760 
4,174 
3,776 
3,914 
3,568 
3,244 
2,850 
2,375 
1998 
9,615 
6,221 
5,124 
4,596 
4,828 
4,050 
3,709 
4,047 
3,297 
3,422 
2,481 
2,321 
The table above corresponds to the sum of the Domestic and International freight 
operations measured m SFTK's It is sorted by size to clearly identify the largest earners 
Except for Federal Express, the rest of the list is comprised by major international 
passenger airlines 
Table 3 Top 12 airlines m terms of cargo SFTK's (Scheduled Freight Tone Kilometer) 
INTERNATIONAL -In millions of SFTK's 
International 
Federal Express 
Lufthansa 
Korean Airlines 
Air France 
Singapore Airlines 
Japan Airlines 
KLM 
British Airways 
Cathay Pacific 
United Airlines 
Northwest Airlines 
American Airlines 
1994 
2,379 
5,355 
3,795 
4,140 
3,291 
3,342 
3,636 
3,047 
2,375 
1,594 
1,917 
1,521 
Source IATA (1995-1999) "World Air 
1995 
2,589 
5,813 
4,233 
4,363 
3,666 
3,509 
3,612 
3,196 
2,790 
1,747 
1,850 
1,610 
Transport; 
1996 
2,949 
5,995 
4,740 
4,654 
4,116 
3,605 
3,780 
3,443 
3,180 
1,903 
1,851 
1,664 
Statistics WATS" 
1997 
3,546 
6,141 
5,553 
4,887 
4,760 
3,888 
3,776 
3,908 
3,568 
2,389 
1,963 
1,702 
1998 
3,832 
6,201 
5,041 
4,575 
4,828 
3,778 
3,709 
4,040 
3,297 
2,485 
1,761 
1,732 
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Even though the table for International freight operations (Table 3) is not sorted 
by size, it is clear that Lufthansa, Singapore Airlines, Air France and Korean Airlines 
dominate in the international arena 
Table 4 Top 12 airlines in terms of cargo SFTK's (Scheduled Freight Tone Kilometers) 
DOMESTIC - In millions of SFTK's 
Domestic 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
4,394 4,864 5,468 5,783 
20 24 23 20 
72 79 90 83 
57 2 18 21 
272 284 286 272 
57 52 6 7 
717 704 855 937 
989 938 887 720 
793 697 673 589 
Source IATA (1995-1999) "World Air Transport Statistics WATS" 
Even though the table for Domestic freight (table 4) operations is not sorted by 
size, the major players m this market are Federal Express, United Airlines, Northwest 
Airlines and Amencan Airlines This basically obeys to the size of the internal trade of 
the United States and the large scale of its domestic passenger market, which demands 
substantial amounts of capacity According to a NASA study17, by 1994 the top 25 
international airlines earned 71 63% of the world's Scheduled RTK's Except for Federal 
Express the top eight international cargo earners are scheduled airlines from Europe and 
Asia For them the revenues denved from cargo operations are much more sigmficant and 
thus their degree of development in this business 
Federal Express 
Lufthansa 
Korean Airlines 
Air France 
Singapore Airlines 
Japan Airlines 
KLM 
British Airways 
Cathay Pacific 
United Airlines 
Northwest Airlines 
American Airlines 
4,058 
18 
64 
86 
250 
63 
734 
1,026 
782 
17
 Johnson P J and Gaier M E "Air Cargo Operations Cost Database" NASA/CR-1998-20765 5 pp 6-2 
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Figure 7 Major Traffic Flows between Regions -1998 
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Figure 7 shows the international scheduled freight flows by region as a percentage 
of IATA international scheduled freight18. A major corridor can be identified running 
through North America, Europe and Asia. The sum of the operations within and between 
those continents accounts for nearly 70% of the world's airfreight transportation. 
IATA (1998) "World Air Transport Statistics" IATA publications. 
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4. PASSENGER BUSINESS CHARACTERISTICS 
4,1 Major Effects of Deregulation 
As a result of the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978, several factors 
affected the nature of the industry. The barriers of entry, which required that every 
project intended to setup an airline within the US, had to be approved or given a 
"certificate of public convenience and necessity" were considered prohibitive for new 
ventures. To be eligible for such certificate, the applicants had to convince the CAB 
(Civil Aeronautic Board - Administrator of civil aeronautics, later known as CAA and 
later on, FAA), that they were fit, willing, able to perform the proposed transportation 
"properly", and that such transportation, was required by the public convenience and 
necessity" The CAB also had discretionary authority to attach to any certificate, 
"reasonable terms, conditions and limitations as public interest may require". There were 
also barriers of exit, which meant that airlines could not lawfully suspend or abandon 
services without CAB approval19. These two factors were modified with the deregulation 
act, giving the industry relative freedom for entry and exit. After December 31, 1981, 
There was only one barrier of entry and it was that the applicant had to be fit, willing and 
able. "For all practical purposes, all airlines (and virtually all would-be airlines)" were 
then free to serve, or to stop serving, any domestic market. With the elimination of these 
19
 Alexander T Wells (1994) "Air Transportation - A Management Perspective" Fourth edition 
43 
barriers, there was an increase in the number of participants in the scheduled air transport 
service. 
Additional significant effects transformed the shape of the industry in the United 
States and in many other countries who followed similar schemes. Some of the additional 
effects were: 
• Hub and Spoke system instead of point to point: As a result of deregulation, and in 
order to optimize their asset utilization, major airlines implemented a Hub and Spoke 
route system. Such system, consisted in establishing a base city (could be more than 
one) and linking all its destinations through that single base and thus, multiplying the 
number of origin destination points on the network. The negative aspect of this new 
scheme was that city pairs that used to have direct service (point to point) now are 
only served through the system and thus change of airplanes and sometimes multiple 
stops are needed. 
• Industry concentration: After deregulation several new start-ups took place and none 
of them survived as they were conceived. Most of the new ventures were acquired, 
merged, or went out of business and as a result industry concentration has increased 
and even more since Pan-Am disappeared (between 1978 and 1997). 
• Commuter airlines: Other effect as a result of industry deregulation was that it opened 
the opportunity for new airlines to fill missing spokes and thus small cities have much 
better and more frequent services in many cases. 
• Effects on price: the effect of deregulation on ticket prices is evident. Today the most 
benefited are the consumers who enjoy lower fares that were not available before. 
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The arrival of low cost carriers foster a new way to do business in the airline industry 
by providing a basic service of transportation without frills. 
• Business profitability: There has been a decline in business profitability as a result of 
a price discrimination fare scheme. Today fewer people are paying the average fare, 
and more people are enjoying reduced or discounted prices. 
US pressures for deregulation had an impact on other countries, such as Canada and 
the United Kingdom, and induced them to be more liberal in their own aviation policies20 
Even though the process of deregulation was slow, by the second half of the 1980's the 
focus was in the European system, which after a bilateral agreement between the UK and 
the Netherlands in 1984, took a series of steps towards eliminating barriers and 
restrictions to air operations. Similarly, some Asian countries started to release 
operational restrictions on many of their national airlines so they were allowed to operate 
both domestic and internationally. 
The bottom line of deregulation practices is that they encourage trade by allowing 
different countries to interact with others and link their economies under established 
freedom agreements. 
20
 Doganis R. (1991) "Flying off Course - The Economics of International Airlines, 2nd Edition" 
Routledge 
4,2 Demand Characteristics 
Similarly to the freighter business, the passenger transportation has cycles and 
suffers from seasonal fluctuations. As it is expected, there is a high correlation between 
the world's economic growth and activity in the airline industry and therefore factors like 
ticket price, traveler's income (availability of disposable income), price and availability 
of other modes of transport, directly affect the demand for air service. 
When talking about demand in the passenger transportation business (by air), it is 
necessary to refer to the concept of elasticity. The elasticity of demand for transport when 
related to the price or fare level has been proven in many studies to be a decisive factor in 
the airline industry21 
The elasticity can be expressed as: 
The formula suggests that a positive change 
(increase) in price P would produce a negative change (decrease) in the quantity Q. The 
opposite effect applies too, as a decrease in price P would imply an increase in demanded 
quantities Q. 
Even though different segments of the market have different elasticity curves, still 
the effect of price in the overall demand is significant. "The fact that leisure travelers are 
accounting for an increasing share of the air transport market, and that leisure travelers 
have greater income elasticity than do business travelers, professors Tretheway and Oum 
concluded that Air travel is not only just cyclical but procyclical". With significant low 
fares, which drive people from the highways or other surface transportation alternatives 
E = -dQ x P 
dP Q 
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to air travel, the impact of price elasticity is even greater nowadays. A clear example of 
this phenomenon is the business strategy of Southwest Airlines and its short haul, low 
fare, no frills and alternative airport service. The company induces people to fly but is 
creating a market that is highly price sensitive. 
As mentioned earlier, the airline business is highly sensitive to the economic 
cycle, which may cause fluctuations in the personal disposable income and GDP22 thus 
affecting almost directly the demand for air travel. As the world economy grows, the 
demand for air transportation may increase too. "Traditionally, passenger traffic has 
grown at about 2.25 times the rate of gross domestic product (GDP) growth; thus if the 
world economy grows by 2%, passenger demand should grow by approximately 4.5%"23. 
According to a study made by ICAO on 1994, passenger demand will average 5 to 6% 
annually over the next two decades. 
Other factors affecting the demand for passenger services are: 
• Frequency, Time and Day of the week of service (also includes season of the year) 
• Population demographics 
• Distance between traveling points 
• System safety 
4.3 Passenger Demand Segmentation 
Unlike cargo, the passenger market is segmented. Airlines in general provide two 
or three kinds of service in the passenger cabin. Since the nature of travel may vary from 
one to another, airlines are required to suit their product to meet different customer needs. 
22
 Paul S. Dempsey (1997) "Airline Management: Strategies for the 21 century" Coast Aire Publications 
23
 Idem 
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Some aspects like flight schedule, express check-in, on-board services, and amenities, 
personal space, and even hospitality rooms at airports, may influence a buying behavior 
in such way that a customer is willing to pay a premium just to have access to some of 
these. 
To understand the concept of passenger service segmentation it is necessary to 
identify the differences between people's purpose of traveling. In many cases it is a 
business-related need; another large group, travels for holidays; the remaining group flies 
for various reasons ranging from visiting friends and relatives (VFR) to sick patients 
traveling to receive special treatments. There are different needs depending on the type of 
travel and therefore airlines provide a particular solution to meet customers expectations 
in each group. 
Some particularities for each group are: 
• Business Traveler: Normally flies on short notice; this means that there is no time to 
book a flight in advance or it may change travel plans suddenly. As a result there is a 
need for an open ticket which allows for any time any flight travel for a given origin 
and destination. For this type of travelers, the schedule, rather than price is the most 
important factor when choosing an airline and therefore airlines focus their efforts to 
better serve this market that is highly profitable. The demographics of this type of 
customer are somehow defined; the business travelers are generally wealthy, with 
high incomes, with ages ranging between 30 to 45 years and in more than 75% of the 
cases are males24 
Shaw Stephen (1999), "Airline Marketing and Management" fourth edition, Ashgate Publications 
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• The leisure traveler: Unlike the business traveler, this type of passenger is price 
sensitive, is flexible in terms of flight schedules and will accept ticket restrictions like 
Saturday night stay-over requirements or non-refundability. The demographics for 
this segment are quite different; there is a balance regarding the male to female ratio 
and the range of ages goes from 35 to 55 years. Since the payer for the ticket fare is 
the passenger himself and not a company, the price becomes an issue when deciding 
the carrier, date and destiny. 
• Other Travelers: There are people traveling with purposes other than leisure or 
business. This segment of the market even though is small still accounts for an 
important amount of passengers every year. Some times referred as visiting friends 
and relatives, this type of traveler may be price insensitive at a certain point. Also ill 
people will tend to travel to be treated in off-town hospitals. The demographics for 
this segment are heterogeneous. 
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The following chart displays some of the decisive factors for airline selection. 
Table 5 Airline Selection Factors 
On a 1 to 10 scale, business Airline Selection Factors 
(mean value on a ten point scale) 
travelers rated with 4.5 the Schedule Factor Leisure Business 
Price 3.9 2.1 
Convenience as a key factor for Schedule Convenience 3.2 4.5 
Frequent Flyer Program 1.5 2 
airline selection. On the other hand Airline Reputation 15 15 
leisure travelers gave more importance to the ticket price, rating it with 3.9 points. 
Because of this preferences many airlines have developed business strategies to attract 
either business or leisure travelers. By picking the most preferred business destinations 
and providing appropriate frequencies and schedules some companies have focused in 
serving the business traveler segment of the market. In the same way, other airlines have 
suited their services to meet leisure traveler needs fostering the development of low cost 
alternatives, which offer a basic product. 
4.4 Supply Characteristics 
To meet the growing demand for passenger transportation the airline industry has 
transformed itself significantly in the last two decades. As a result of deregulated 
environments in several countries, the industry has grown in size, span and in addition it 
now offers a more complex product tailored to adapt to varying customer needs. 
4.5 A Strategy for the Passenger Business 
Like in almost every industry and according to Michael Porter, there are three 
major strategies that a firm may adopt to outperform other competitors. The first is the 
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overall cost leadership strategy, the second is the differentiation strategy and the third is 
the focus strategy25. Airlines in general stick to one of these three categories clearly 
however some of the large carriers have tried to tackle the market using more than one 
simultaneously. 
4.5.1 Cost Leadership 
The Cost Leadership Strategy, as Porter stated in his book Techniques for 
Analyzing Industries and Competitors, this strategy suggests that "having a low cost 
position yields the firm above average returns in its industry despite the presence of 
strong competitive forces. Its cost position gives the firm a defense against rivalry from 
competitors, because its lower costs mean that it can still earn returns after its competitors 
have competed away their profits through rivalry". 
In the airline industry the existence of so called "Low Cost Carriers" is, after 
deregulation, very common. 
Because an airline's costs define the limit of how low it can profitably price its 
service, and because most airline consumers value low prices above all other carrier 
selection factors, the carrier with the lowest cost structure has a powerful competitive 
advantage26. The success of Southwest Airlines as a model for a low cost - low fare 
carrier, has motivated a wide variety of new airline ventures to capture the low cost 
market, however few of them have survived. This kind of air travel which offers nothing 
else than a seat, with minimum on board service, no meals, with a simple fare structure in 
single class accommodations, is the standard for this breed that is expanding worldwide. 
25
 Porter M.E., Competitive Strategy (1980) "Techniques for analyzing industries and competitors" Free 
Press, New York 
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Some of the key success factors for these companies are the quick turn around 
times, single type of fleet and alternate airport destinations. In the United States the 
typical example is Southwest Airlines, even though several new players have emerged. 
Worldwide, other companies have attempted to emulate Southwest's practices 
successfully, demonstrating this way that there is an appealing demand for this particular 
type of service. 
Low Cost Service Characteristics 
• High percentage of direct sales to reduce CRS fees and travel agent commissions. 
• On-board service with basic or no amenities and no food. 
• Reduced staffing at counters, gates and on-board. 
• Single class service. 
• Origin and destination ports are secondary airports (not main). 
• Airline fleet conformed by a single type of aircraft to reduce spares inventory costs, 
maintenance expenses, and personnel training expenses (pilots, mechanics and flight 
attendants) among others. 
• Commonly, point to point service instead of hub and spoke. 
Alexander T Wells (1996)"Air Transportation a Management Perspective" Fourth edition 
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4.5.2 Differentiation Strategy 
Under this strategy, according to Porter, Ideally the firm differentiates itself in 
several dimensions. Differentiation provides insulation against competitive rivalry 
because of brand loyalty of customers, which makes them less price sensitive. In 
addition, the uniqueness the differentiation provides is a barrier of entry for other 
competitors27 
In the case of airlines, some attempt to make a difference since the customer calls 
or browses the Internet to find a flight or place a reservation. One of the most important 
factors for differentiation is the route structure, which gives an airline a unique advantage 
over other carriers that may not have the same destinations or mix. 
In every stage of the process an airline may choose to differentiate its product. At 
the airport counter, some companies offer a preferred lane for valued customers or 
frequent flyers; in addition there could be an upgrade policy to reward selected 
passengers. Inside the aircraft, depending on the type of service (first class, business or 
coach) many airlines try to attract customers by offering special seat distribution and 
access to a wide variety of services (Laptop power connections, on-board phone and 
Internet service, personal TV with VCR, etc.). On-board service is another factor for 
differentiation; foodservice and flight attendant disposition and policies represent some of 
the areas an airline may develop to stand aside. 
27
 Porter M.E., Competitive Strategy (1980) 'Techniques for analyzing industries and competitors" Free 
Press, New York 
The differentiation strategy is costly to implement but allows the airline to exploit 
almost all the available market segments, charge a premium for its enhanced service and 
also helps to increase market share. On the other hand, it increases the complexity of the 
operation because of the need to implement certain business practices and marketing 
strategies to keep a sustained differentiation, while operating profitably. As mentioned 
differentiated carriers incur in high production costs and often the management faces 
strategy inconsistencies due to the different products they offer. 
I would say that the majority of the world's carriers fall under this category as a 
result of their origin and development. Many were born as Country Flag Carriers and thus 
offered a complete and particular differential service. Singapore Airlines, United 
Airlines, Lufthansa, Varig, Alitalia or KLM are clear examples of this category. 
4.5.3 Focus Strategy 
Under this scheme, the company focuses on a particular group of buyers, which 
share or posses homogeneous characteristics and needs. The Focus strategy is aimed to a 
particular market niche instead of trying to cover a wide spectrum of customers. While 
tailoring a product to serve a particular market, a company implementing this strategy 
may find itself with better opportunities in terms of efficiency, and effectiveness than 
other competitors with broad market orientation. 
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Regional carriers and shuttle companies fill this market. By offering convenient 
direct routes, appropriate schedules and executive services, some airlines have attracted a 
niche of the market that is willing to pay more in order to avoid regular airlines. 
4.6 Major Scheduled Passenger Carriers 
After the deregulation process in the United States, the shape of the airline 
industry changed; Big players such as Pan Am, Eastern, or Braniff disappeared as they 
failed to quickly recognize and accept the new rules of the game. Worldwide, the 
panorama has not been too different for some airlines, as governments of several 
countries have followed the U.S model. New entrants in the industry represent one of the 
major changes after a deregulation process. Even though major airlines have disappeared, 
some others like flag carriers have managed to survive the pressure from the new entrants 
either by effective management or by government subsidizing. 
IATA's rankings for Scheduled Available Seat-Kilometers Flown represent the 
supply of space for passenger transportation in scheduled carriers worldwide. The 
following chart shows the top 10 airlines in terms of SASK (Scheduled Available Seat 
Kilometers) according to IATA, classified in domestic and international operations. 
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Table 6 Available Seat Kilometers in Scheduled Carriers - IATA 1999: 
Intemational Domestic 
Airline 
1 British Airways 
2 United Airlines 
3 Lufthansa 
4 Japan Airlines 
5 Air France 
6 American Airlines 
7 Singapore Airlines 
8 KLM 
9 Northwest Airlines 
10 Cathay Pacific 
SASKTI 
157,909,850 
105,405,774 
93,836,727 
88,121,338 
86,208,200 
83,514,973 
81,998,000 
74,013,603 
63,524,016 
60,257,978 
Airline 
1 Delta Air Lines 
2 United Airlines 
3 American Airlines 
4 Northwest Airlines 
5 US Airways 
6 Continental Airlines 
7 All Nippon Airways 
8TWA-TransV\forld 
9 America West 
10 Japan Airlines 
SASKTD 
175,151,416 
174,436,942 
166,257,461 
83,422,253 
81,819,059 
78,860,440 
54,114,227 
45,434,091 
37,576,328 
26,858,052 
SASKTI: Scheduled Available Seat Kilometers Total International 
SASKTD: Scheduled Available Seat Kilometers Total Domestic 
Excessive capacity is one of the major headaches of the airline industry, but since 
offering convenient and frequent schedules are factors for a higher market share 
(differentiation) many carriers flood the market with seats. 
Table 7 Total Available Seat Kilometers in Scheduled Carriers - IATA 1999 
Total International & Domestic 
Airline 
1 United Airlines 
2 American Airlines 
3 Delta Air Lines 
4 British Airways 
5 Northwest Airlines 
6 Japan Airlines 
7 Continental Airlines 
8 Lufthansa 
9 Air France 
10 US Airways 
Total 
172,593,263 
154,047,387 
140,903,803 
100,830,386 
90,629,252 
70,913,649 
69,979,100 
62,977,221 
61,052,434 
56,299,529 
IATA (1999) "WATS World Air Transport Statistics" IATA publications 
TATA (1999) "WATS World Air Transport Statistics" IATA publications 
ON 
57 
4.7 Airline Alliances 
Due to restrictive ownership laws, and cabotage restrictions, airlines have been 
encouraged to group in different types of associations that in addition expand their 
networks and allow them to take advantage of cost reductions and economies of scale. 
One of the most popular forms of association is the Code-Sharing, which makes possible 
to the carrier to book passengers in another's network seamlessly, expanding the scope of 
operation and enhancing marketing opportunities. A second form of partnering is the 
Blocked Space Arrangement which consist of a number of seats that a carrier will have 
reserved for its partner, guaranteeing this way seamless connections while providing 
certainty of available space30. Airlines can also be partners in a Computer Reservation 
System (CRS); this type of alliance is not demanding in terms of resources or 
commitments and therefore is one of the most common31. Other types of association are 
insurance and parts pooling, joint service, management contract, baggage handling, join 
marketing and equity/governance32. 
In the early nineties the alliances were somehow unstable and weak as a result of 
unclear member positions or over optimistic expectations, therefore many of them lasted 
no longer than a year or two. As the industry matured, new intentions of association 
emerged by the end of the past decade, and four fairly defined groups shaped up. They 
have common attributes such as clear objectives of the alliance, and methods of 
measuring performance. Moreover they all have key players as members who add a 
3
 Paul S. Dempsey (1997) "Airline Management: Strategies for the 21 century" Coast Aire Publications 
pp. 422 
Rhoades Dawna, Lush Heather (1997) "A typology of strategic alliances in the airline industry: 
Propositions for stability and duration" Embry Riddle Aeronautical University 
32
 Idem 
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strategic strength to the group by providing a particular set of routes, airport slots, fleet or 
markets. 
The following figure shows the major alliances as of October 2000 with their 
members. 
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Figure 9 Maior airline alliances as of October 2000. Source: World Wide Web 
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KLM, Northwest, Alitalia and Continental are members of another alliance, 
which has not been assigned a name yet. 
1998 SCHEDULED INTERNATIONAL PASSENGER 
/ Km TRAFFIC SHARE OF IATA MEMBERS 
QUALIFLYER 
5% 
KLM / NW / AZ 
/ 
f CONTINENTAL 
/ 11% 
STAR 
ALLIANCE 
16% 
ONEWORLD 
21% 
Figure 10 1998 Scheduled International Passenger / Km Traffic Share of lata Members 33 
As shown above there are still many carriers that still don't belong to any of the 
major global alliances (47%) however this situation no only depends on the carrier but 
also on its ability to provide valuable assets to the group represented either by convenient 
schedules, routes or capacity. 
33 IATA (19991 "WATS World Air Transport Statistics' IATA publications 
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5. CARGO AND PASSENGER OPERATIONS 
5.1 Advantages 
One of the most important advantages passenger airlines have over all-cargo 
carriers is that they can offer available belly space for cargo purposes at a marginal cost 
due to the aircraft design and the nature of their main business. Airlines can benefit from 
joint costs sharing freight and passenger loads since there are some commonalties in the 
transportation for both of them. Also as mentioned before, a large amount of the 
airfreight is transported in regular scheduled passenger aircraft, which in 1995 provided 
66% of the belly space for cargo (including combi aircraft), as shown in figure 4. 
When referring to joint costs and the advantages of economies of scale, Michael 
Porter explains how those airlines with passenger - cargo operations combined, may have 
a substantial advantage over those firms competing in only one market (cargo or 
passengers solely). Airline operators know this pretty well and that is why many of them 
offer both products, however the main focus is always on the passenger side of the 
business. 
It is clear that air cargo provides an additional source of revenues for passenger 
airlines and moreover it could make a significant contribution to the profitability of them 
by covering costs that are indivisible. According to IATA, "without the benefit of this 
additional freight revenue, passenger fares would be higher" or in a different scenario the 
operation of a carrier would not be profitable at all. 
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In terms of revenues, the major international passenger carriers derive on average 
79% of their operating income from the passenger operation. Unfortunately none of 
them make a distinction with regard to the operating costs of the cargo activity (allocated 
costs) and thus making it impossible to determine the magnitude of the benefits of having 
joint costs or other passenger-cargo synergies as stated above. 
5.2 Disadvantages 
Unfortunately and according to a NASA investment model for cargo35 "the air 
cargo market shares more differences with the air passenger market than similarities". 
In general, the passenger carriers that decide to deal with cargo operations face a series of 
contradictions while trying to balance the two businesses. The essence of the conflict 
stems from different demand drivers, which determine the structure for each particular 
activity and its needs. Some of the major differences are: 
• Route structure: The airfreight is not concerned as to whether it is flown east or west, 
during the day or at night; on the other hand the passenger operation is very 
demanding in terms of schedules and routes. 
• Seasonal Fluctuations: For the cargo business this behavior is typical for products 
with seasonal demand such as flowers, fruits or fashion items, however this 
phenomenon generally does not coincide with passenger high season periods. 
• Directionality: Unlike airline passengers who normally fly round trip, air cargo flies 
one way36 thus generating imbalances in terms of load factor depending on the 
destination. 
34ICAO (1994 - 1999) "Civil Aviation Statistics of the World" ICAO publications 1994 - 1999 
• Type of customer Freight forwarders, manufacturing corporations and mail agencies 
are the most common customers of air cargo carriers and thus it is a business to 
business relation When dealing with passengers, there are several structural 
differences such as the market segmentation of the demand (business, leisure or VFR) 
obviously not present in cargo operations 
In terms of costs there are several differences between the two businesses since 
passengers demand a completely different service The following table explains the main 
costs involved m each operation 
Table 8 Passenger vs Cargo Indirect Operating Costs37 
Category Passenger Cargo Both 
Passenger food and beverage 
Passenger service other 
Line Service 
Baggage handling 
Cargo handling 
Passenger advertising and publicity 
Passenger reservations and sales 
Freight sales advertising and publicity 
Property advertising and publicity 
Property reservation and sales 
Maintenance (ground property and equipment) 
Depreciation (ground property and equipment) 
Depreciation Maintenance Equipment 
General Administration 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Several airlines have stopped their all cargo services due to the poor performance 
of the operation in terms of reliability and profitability The major cause for the 
mentioned situation is the fleet itself Because freight rates are not high enough and 
because of the low average daily utilization of the aircraft cannot justify the high capital 
35
 Johnson J and Santmire T (1999) "Air Carrier Investment Model - Cargo" NASA /CR-1999-208984 
36
 Smith Peter M (1974) "Air Freight Operations. Economics and Marketing' Chp 5 Faber and Faber 
Limited 
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costs of purchasing a new airplane, the majority of the carriers operate old equipment that 
requires frequent maintenance and is not fuel-efficient. 
When facing the decision on whether or not to invest in cargo, and after evaluating 
the conflicts mentioned earlier one of the most common questions asked is if there is 
money to be made in the cargo business. To help in answering this question, the 
following chapter is dedicated to analyze the potential of airfreight and its benefits for 
passenger airlines. 
Johnson J and Santmire T (1999) "Air Carrier Investment Model - Cargo" NASA /CR-1999-208984 
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6. AIR CARGO IS A PROMISING BUSINESS 
This chapter will show the market potential for airfreight, explain the factors 
influencing this activity, compare its growth trends as compared to passenger figures, and 
explain the different strategies a carrier may adopt when deciding on whether or not to 
invest in cargo operations. 
Air Cargo is a separate business system in a separate market. There have been several 
changes in the market during the last two decades, which have fostered the evolution of 
the airfreight industry, which is becoming a logistic solution and a value adding activity. 
6.1 Factors Influencing Air Cargo 
Although the air cargo business has grown in a sustainable way during the last 15 
years , several factors are affecting the way shippers and companies decide about 
transportation alternatives. Not only the GDP has a strong relationship with the air 
transportation activity but also factors such as product life cycles, liberalization and 
globalization of the markets, modern information technology resources, the Internet 
commerce activity and new competitors in the market, have transformed the way 
business are being done. One of the major changes has been in distribution channels in 
which transportation from A to B is now part of a complete logistic system. The 
following are some of the most important factors that are shaping the actual air cargo 
business39. 
Boeing (1998)" World Air Cargo Overview" Boeing Commercial Aircraft 
Herrmann, Trefzger and Crux (1998) "Challenges for Tomorrow's Successful Air Freight Providers' 
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• Liberalization and globalization of the markets: In the last 15 years we have seen 
many changes in the world. Free trade agreements between nations; countries that 
were traditionally closed to major international trade, now becoming active 
commercial players, and several international air transport agreements, are a few 
samples of the magnitude of the changes that the air transport business is perceiving. 
In addition, after the United States commercial aviation deregulation in 1978, several 
other regions followed the liberalization trends such as Scandinavia in 1980 and 
countries within the European Union in early 1997. The deregulation of the Asian 
region is crucial for world trade figures and according to Boeing, IATA and ICAO 
predictions, the Asian markets will be the ones with the highest growth rates in the 
next ten to fifteen years, hence their importance. On the other hand, the globalization 
of the economies has also modified the air cargo business environment. Today, for 
many companies the world is a single market place40. Also because of the 
homogenization of consumer requirements we see multi origin products that are a 
blend of a series of components manufactured in facilities scattered around the globe 
and assembled somewhere else. Also important are the savings a company might 
obtain by relocating their production facilities abroad. As a result, the integration of 
the world's nations economies and commerce practices, require higher transportation 
capacities and greater system efficiency. 
• Modern Information Technology Resources: Significant development of EDI 
Technologies (Electronic Data Interchange) allow companies to save in procurement 
expenses and to effective manage the information related to logistics. The ability to 
40
 Herrmann, Trefzger and Crux (1998) "Challenges for Tomorrow's Successfiil Air Freight Providers" pp. 
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integrate data from the manufacturing process with sales and warehouse, enables 
corporations to better manage the inventories and forecast needs accurately. IT 
innovations and developments in many industries is making possible to reduce 
inventory levels and locate resources worldwide; this may become a competitive 
advantage. Further on, the ability to "track" (verify the status, location, etc..) with 
accuracy a particular shipment makes feasible for a company to spin-off outsource or 
split its production processes to other companies in the world, in order to reduce costs 
or enhance product quality. 
Shorter Product Life Cycles: As a result of technological advances in 
communications and information systems, consumers are today more aware than ever 
of the world's market trends, fashions and product tendencies. It is not surprising that 
products today are announced, developed, introduced and replaced with new ones in 
shorter periods of time. Computers and computer accessories, software, cellular 
phones, personal digital assistants (PDA's) and many others are a few examples of 
the accelerated obsolescence pace of many products. Consequently the needs for 
replacement and thus distribution for these items demands for fast, available and 
convenient transportation solutions. An additional factor involved is the 
miniaturization of products, which modifies the value to volume / weight ratio and 
therefore the higher the demand for air transportation services as warehousing costs 
for these products tend to go up. 
The Internet and E-commerce phenomena: The impact of these factors is tremendous 
in the distribution chain of many companies which six or seven years ago would have 
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never thought about the potential of electronic channels. As consumers have access to 
global markets, the need for goods transportation is now more evident than ever. 
According to Air Cargo World Magazine41, by the year 2004 the expected e-
commerce sales will be $6.79 trillion. Table 9 shows the percentage of total sales forecast 
to be converted over the Internet in regions and selected countries by 2004. 
Table 9 Percentage of total sales forecast to be converted over the Internet in regions and 
selected countries by 2004. 
NORTH AMERICA 
USA 
Canada 
ASIA PACIFIC 
Japan 
Australia 
Korea 
WESTERN EUROPE 
Netherlands 
UK 
Germany 
LATIN AMERICA 
REST OF THE WORLD 
Total 
12.8% 
13.3% 
9.2% 
8.0% 
8.4% 
16.4% 
16.4% 
8.0% 
9.2% 
7.1% 
6.5% 
2.4% 
2.4% 
8.6% 
In September 2000 several freight forwarders and airlines signed contracts with 
GF-X a web based system for buying and selling air cargo capacity42. The system enables 
airlines to offer different deals to different customers, allowing them to trial new products 
in confidence. Also according to David Ravech the company's Co-chief executive, "this 
will give airlines a new yield management tool". Business like this will add dynamism to 
the air cargo industry and will also make transactions more transparent to the customers. 
41
 Air Cargo World Magazine (August - 2000) 
42
 Airline Business (September 2000) 
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6.2 International Trade Outlook 
According to the 1999 World Trade Organization Report, the international trade 
volumes have experienced better than expected growth rates despite the financial crisis 
impact in the Asian economy and the deep recession in Latin America. Even though 
these two factors affected the overall output and trade flows globally, for 1999 the picture 
was more optimistic. 
The panorama for the year 2000 indicates that global economic output is expected 
to increase from 3 per cent in 1999 to about 3.5 per cent for the present year. According 
to the WTO "the volume of world merchandise trade growth should reach 6.5 per cent. 
Higher trade growth is possible, in particular, if the demand in Western Europe and Japan 
pick up more strongly than currently projected". 
Furthermore the report affirms that at the end of the present year the GDP growth 
of industrial countries could expand by 3 per cent or one half per cent faster than in 1999 
as the United States is showing growth rates below those of the Western Europe and 
Japan. Latin America and the Middle East should see an improvement in terms of GDP 
growth after experiencing a deep economic crisis in 1999. African economies are also 
projected to experience a higher growth. In addition the report states that "Asia's 
developing countries GDP growth is projected to remain unchanged as the impact of the 
expansionary fiscal policies and the rebuilding of inventories will be less important in 
2000 than in 1999, but offset by a strengthening of fixed investment and private 
consumption" 
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The following charts correspond to WTO (World Trade Organization) statistics 
for the last three years in terms of merchandise movement by region. 
Table 10 World Merchandise Trade by region 1997 -199943 
Growth in the volume of world merchandise trade by selected region, 1997-99 
(Percentage change) 
Exports Imports 
1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999 
World (a) 
North America 
Latin America 
Mexico 
Other Latin America 
Western Europe 
European Union (15) 
Transition economies 
Asia 
Japan 
Asia(5)b 
10.5 
11 
11.5 
19.5 
6.5 
9.5 
9.5 
10.5 
13 
12 
16.5 
4.5 
3.5 
7.5 
11 
5.5 
5.5 
6 
5 
3.5 
-1.5 
13 
4.5 
4.5 
7 
13.5 
2 
3.5 
3.5 
-3 
6 
2 
11.5 
13 
22.5 
28 
20 
9 
8.5 
13.5 
5.5 
1.5 
3 
10.5 
8.5 
15.5 
4.5 
8.5 
8.5 
5 
-8.5 
-5.5 
-22.5 
10.5 
-2 
15 
-12 
3.5 
4 
-10 
9 
9.5 
17.5 
a Average of export and import growth. 
b Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. 
Note:Separate volume data are not available for Africa and the Middle East, 
although estimates for these regions have been made in order to calculate a world total. 
Table 10 clearly shows the disappointing growth in merchandise volumes 
(imports and exports) for 1998 as a result of the mentioned crisis in Asia and the 
depression of several Latin American countries. However 1999 showed symptoms of 
recovery at the time the report was written, and the World's GDP for that year grew 
about 2% in real terms according to the Boeing's current world economic outlook. 
43
 WTO (1999) "World Trade Organization Annual Report" www.wto.org 
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Figure 11 World GDP by region 1995 - 2000 44 
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Figure 11 illustrates different countries/regions GDP curves as compared to the 
World for the 1995 through 2000 period. It clearly shows the quick recovery after the 
Asian crisis by mid 1999 of several economies. Because of the close correlation between 
the World's GDP and the air cargo industry the above figure suggests an interesting up 
coming cycle especially for carriers operating to and from Asian countries and Africa. 
Extracted from IATA's "1999 - 2003 Freight Forecast" IATA Publications 
71 
6.3 Air Cargo Growth Potential 
According to a NASA study45, over the past ten years, worldwide air cargo traffic 
has grown at an average rate of 8.6% while passenger traffic has grown at a rate of 4.8%. 
Analyzing the future of the industry, Boeing's forecasts expect a long-term air cargo 
growth of 6.4% per year through the year 201746 Similarly as compared to surface 
transportation alternatives, Merge Global determined that since 1990, international 
airfreight traffic has grown approximately 2.5 percentage points faster per year than 
international ocean volumes47 
Figure 12 Boeing's forecast for World air cargo over the next 20 years48 
World Air Cargo Will Grow at 6.4% per Year 
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Figure 12 provides a clear picture of the expected growth for the air cargo 
business over the next two decades. 
45
 Johnson P J and Gaier M E "Air Cargo Operations Cost Database" NASA/CR-1998-207655 pp 1-1 
46
 Boeing (1998/1999) "World Air Cargo Forecast" Boeing Publications 
47
 Merge Global (2000) "World Air Cargo Forecast" Air Cargo World - May 2000 
48
 Boeing (1998/1999) "World Air Cargo Forecast"www boeing com/commercial 
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The following tables and figures correspond to predictions and forecasts from 
different organizations such as IATA, ICAO, the WTO and Boeing. 
Table 11 Total Market Region Forecasts 1999-2003 
International Scheduled and Charter Freight - Region Summary - Total Freight Tonnes 49 
Region Name 
RegName 
Caribbean 
Central America 
Central Asia 
Central/West Africa 
Eastern Africa 
Eastern/CentEurope 
Lower South America 
Middle East 
North Africa 
North America 
Northeast Asia 
South Asia 
South Pacific 
Southeast Asia 
Southern Africa 
Upper South America 
Western Europe 
TOTAL 
number of 
metric 
tonnes in 
1999 
(tonnes) 
Frt 1999 (t) 
23.23 
102.54 
11.25 
109.76 
174.75 
259.66 
639.71 
1370.80 
186.19 
4433.16 
6877.73 
757.56 
885.95 
3075.88 
192.01 
70.45 
7623.77 
TOTAL 
number of 
metric 
tonnes in 
2000 
(tonnes) 
Frt 2000 (t) 
23.64 
106.47 
11.58 
115.51 
185.11 
274.19 
646.07 
1454.61 
193.74 
4710.16 
7267.35 
803.37 
919.37 
3257.99 
201.16 
71.87 
8012.66 
TOTAL 
number of 
metric 
tonnes in 
2001 
(tonnes) 
Frt 2001 (t) 
24.45 
110.94 
11.93 
120.69 
195.60 
287.38 
667.95 
1539.07 
202.62 
4983.60 
7668.54 
854.25 
955.51 
3453.14 
209.93 
74.41 
8414.31 
TOTAL 
number of 
metric 
tonnes in 
2002 
(tonnes) 
Frt 2002 (t) 
25.45 
115.70 
12.31 
125.99 
206.40 
298.82 
696.51 
1621.20 
211.75 
5260.26 
8085.05 
908.33 
990.96 
3657.34 
218.65 
77.38 
8827.17 
TOTAL 
number of 
metric 
tonnes in 
2003 
(tonnes) 
Frt 2003 (t) 
26.38 
120.46 
12.72 
131.04 
216.37 
310.63 
726.17 
1696.10 
221.12 
5550.22 
8520.68 
965.48 
1025.66 
3872.87 
227.55 
80.24 
9252.23 
From Table 11 we can clearly identify the most attractive markets in terms of 
cargo movement, located in Western Europe, North America, Northeast and Southeast 
Asia. Airlines operating between these regions may have above average cargo revenues 
due to the volume of activity. Even though some regions experience more movement 
than others, the expected growth rate of some of them such as the Middle East and 
49 IATA (1999) "Freight Forecast 1999 - 2003" IATA Publications 
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Eastern Africa as shown in table 11, unveils new opportunities for carriers already 
operating in those areas. 
Table 12 Average Annual Growth Rate - Region Forecasts 1999-2003 
International Scheduled and Charter Freight50 
Region Name 
RegName 
Caribbean 
Central America 
Central Asia 
Central/West Africa 
Eastern Africa 
Eastern/Cent. Europe 
Lower South America 
Middle East 
North Africa 
Average 
annual 
growth rate 
1999-2003 
(%) 
Avg 99-03 
2.1 
4.0 
1.2 
4.0 
5.4 
4.4 
2.1 
5.6 
3.8 
Region Name 
RegName 
North America 
Northeast Asia 
South Asia 
South Pacific 
Southeast Asia 
Southern Africa 
Upper South America 
Western Europe 
Average 
annual 
growth rate 
1999-2003 
(%) 
Avg 99-03 
6.1 
5.9 
6.3 
4.0 
6.4 
4.8 
2.0 
4.9 
Table 12 provides figures for average annual growth from 1999 to 2003 by world 
region. As explained earlier in this study there is a direct relation between the GDP of a 
region and its associated air travel (passengers and cargo), therefore countries with more 
optimistic economic growths will produce an increase in the amount of regional trade and 
therefore higher demand for air transportation. According to Boeing the Intra Asian 
freight market will be the fastest growing market with an average of 8.6% per year and 
will account for more than 50% of the world market by the year 201951. 
Figure 11 represents the increase in share of processing goods (re-exported) for 
several countries from 1990 thorough 1999. For the last ten to fifteen years several 
developing countries have worked intensely with their governments to establish special 
50
 IATA (1999) "Freight Forecast 1999 - 2003" 
51
 Boeing (2000) "World Air Cargo Forecast" www.boeing.com/commercial/cargo 
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economic zones in which goods are processed and then re-exported. Under this scheme, 
the economic authorities of the developing country grant, under certain conditions, duty-
free access to those imports, which are bound, for the processing and assembling of 
goods destined for exports. This practice has proven to be a key factor for the increase of 
international trade (for the countries involved), economic development and a source for 
employment generation. The processing goods industry in countries like China, Mexico, 
El Salvador and Philippines has evolved considerably to a point that many other 
neighboring countries have imitated the model and developed similar practices to benefit 
from increased international trade and domestic economic growth. 
Figure 13 Share of processing trade in total merchandise exports of selected countries, 
1990-99 (Percentages)52. 
The most common 
processed goods are clothing, 
electronic devices, toys, computers 
and software, among others. For 
their nature these items are 
preferably shipped by air (high 
price-to-volume ratio and time to 
market considerations) therefore the 
higher the growth of the processed 
goods industry the higher the 
demand for air transportation. 
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52 WTO (1999) "World Trade Organization Annual Report" www.wto.org 
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Table 12 corresponds to IATA7s forecast from 1999 through 2003 for the airline 
passenger market. Because between 55% and 60% of the total cargo airlift capacity is 
provided by regular passenger aircraft, an increase in the demand for this service 
automatically increases the amount of belly space available if more aircrafts are 
introduced (to meet the increased passenger demand). 
Table 13 Total Market Region-Region Forecasts 1999-200353 
International Scheduled Passengers - Region Summary 
Region Name Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of 
passengers passengers passengers passengers passengers 
in 1999 in 2000 in 2001 in 2002 in 2003 
(000) (000) (000) (000) (000) 
Region Name Pax 1999 Pax 2000 Pax 2001 Pax 2002 Pax 2003 
Caribbean 
Central America 
Central Asia 
Central/WestAfrica 
Eastern Africa 
Eastern/Cent. Eu rope 
Lower South America 
Middle East 
North Africa 
North America 
Northeast Asia 
South Asia 
South Pacific 
Southeast Asia 
Southern Africa 
Upper South America 
Western Europe 
8.829 
19739 
469 
2,143 
4,557 
21,529 
14,918 
34,774 
9,695 
125,441 
93,354 
18,021 
20,989 
54,998 
3,690 
6,414 
276.943 
9.272 
20,652 
501 
2,245 
4,821 
22,723 
15,548 
36,626 
10,202 
130.164 
97.251 
19.026 
22,389 
58,440 
3,955 
6,757 
291.926 
9.711 
21.737 
530 
2.345 
5,103 
24,051 
16,361 
38,289 
10,680 
135,803 
101,585 
20,026 
23,653 
61.950 
4,232 
7,157 
307,395 
10,267 
23.011 
560 
2,436 
5,389 
25.419 
17,230 
40,025 
11.165 
142.056 
106,485 
21.097 
24,833 
65.852 
4.506 
7,557 
322.927 
10.830 
24.386 
588 
2.533 
5,681 
26,746 
18,165 
41,723 
11,630 
148,650 
111,478 
22.206 
26,066 
69.996 
4,788 
7,954 
338.571 
By analyzing both tables 12 and 13, we can determine that the Caribbean, Central 
America, the South Pacific and Eastern Europe will experience above 5.1% growth 
mostly as a result of the increased activity of the "processing goods" industry in those 
regions. On the other hand, it is expected that the markets of Asia in general grow at a 
fast pace as they recover from the crisis. 
IATA (2000) "World Air Transport Statistics" IATA Publications 
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Table 14 Average Annual Growth by Region (Scheduled Passengers) 54 
Region Name 
Caribbean 
Central America 
Central Asia 
Central/West.Africa 
Eastern Africa 
Eastern/Cent. Europe 
Lower South America 
Middle East 
Average 
annual % 
growth rate 
1999-2003 
5.1 
5.3 
3.8 
4.4 
6.0 
5.0 
4.6 
4.7 
Region Name 
North Africa 
North America 
Northeast Asia 
South Asia 
South Pacific 
Southeast Asia 
Southern Africa 
Upper South America 
Western Europe 
Average 
annual % 
growth rate 
1999-2003 
5.0 
4.2 
4.3 
5.3 
5.5 
6.2 
6.8 
3.6 
5.3 
Table 15 Total Market Region Forecasts 1999-2003, International Scheduled and Charter 
Freight vs. Passengers. IATA 1999 
Region Name 
RegName 
Caribbean 
Central Amenca 
Central Asia 
Central/West Africa 
Eastern Africa 
Eastern/CentEurope 
Lower South America 
Middle East 
North Africa 
North America 
Northeast Asia 
South Asia 
South Pacific 
Southeast Asia 
Southern Africa 
Upper South America 
Western Europe 
Growth rate 1999 
over 1998 (%) 
Freight 
-2.2 
3.7 
-6.1 
2.0 
4.9 
3.7 
-2.3 
6.3 
1.5 
72 
7.7 
6.3 
4.9 
8.1 
6.7 
-3.0 
4.6 
Pax 
4.6 
4.6 
-3.9 
4.8 
7.3 
2.7 
2.9 
5.0 
6.2 
3.5 
3.5 
4.9 
5.4 
6.0 
7.2 
-4.0 
5.8 
Growth rate 2000 
over 1999(%) 
Freight 
1.8 
3.8 
2.9 
5.2 
5.9 
5.6 
1.0 
6.1 
4.1 
6.2 
5.7 
6.0 
3.8 
5.9 
4.8 
2.0 
5.1 
Pax 
5.0 
4.6 
6.8 
4.7 
5.8 
5.5 
4.2 
5.3 
5.2 
3.8 
4.2 
5.6 
6.7 
6.3 
7.2 
5.4 
5.4 
Growth rate 2001 
over 2000 (%) 
Freight 
3.4 
4.2 
3.0 
4.5 
5.7 
4.8 
3.4 
5.8 
4.6 
5.8 
5.5 
6.3 
3.9 
6.0 
4.4 
3.5 
5.0 
Pax 
4.7 
5.3 
5.8 
4.5 
5.8 
5.8 
5.2 
4.5 
4.7 
43 
45 
5.3 
5.6 
6.0 
7.0 
5.9 
5.3 
Growth rate 2002 
over 2001 (%) 
Freight 
41 
4.3 
3.1 
44 
5.5 
4.0 
4.3 
5.3 
4.5 
5.6 
5.4 
6.3 
3.7 
5.9 
4.2 
4.0 
4.9 
Pax 
5.7 
5.9 
5.6 
3.9 
5.6 
5.7 
5.3 
4.5 
4.5 
4.6 
4.8 
5.3 
5.0 
6.3 
6.5 
5.6 
5.1 
Growth rate 
2003 over 
(%) 
Freight| 
3.7 
4.1 
3.3 
4.0 
4.8 
40 
4.3 
4.6 
4.4 
5.5 
5.4 
6.3 
3.5 
5.9 
4.1 
3.7 
4.8 
2002 
Pax 
55 
6.0 
5.2 
4.0 
5.4 
5.2 
54 
4.2 
4.2 
4.6 
4.7 
5.3 
5.0 
6.3 
6.3 
5.3 
4.8 
Table 14 compares the growth percentages by region for cargo and passenger 
markets for the 1999 through 2003 period. Even though the passenger market may look 
more appealing in terms of growth for some regions, table 15 shows those with cargo 
volume growth above passenger load growth. 
54 IATA (2000) "World Air Transport Statistics" IATA Publications 
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Table 16 Regions with higher growth rates for air cargo than for passenger 
transportation55 
REGIONS WITH HIGHER GROWTH RATES FOR CARGO 
Growth rate 1999 Growth rale 2000 Growth rate 2001 
over 1998 (%) over 1999 (%) over 2000 (%) 
THAN FOR PASSENGERS 
Growth rate 2002 Growth rate 2003 
over 2001 (%) over 2002 (%) 
Eastern/Cent Europe Central/West Africa Central/West Africa Central/West Africa Central/West Africa 
Middle East Eastern Africa Middle East 
North America Eastern/CentEurope North America 
Northeast Asia Middle East Northeast Asia 
South Asia North America South Asia 
Southeast Asia Northeast Asia 
Upper South America South Asia 
Middle East 
North America 
Northeast Asia 
South Asia 
Middle East 
North Africa 
North America 
Northeast Asia 
South Asia 
Table 17 Cargo vs. Passenger market growth by region for 2000 through 2003 
Region Name 
RegName 
Caribbean 
Central America 
Central Asia 
Central/West Africa 
Eastern Africa 
Eastern/CentEurope 
Lower South Amenca 
Middle East 
North Africa 
North America 
Northeast Asia 
South Asia 
South Pacific 
Southeast Asia 
Southern Africa 
Upper South America 
Western Europe 
Average 
annual 
growth rate 
2000-2003 
(%) 
Cargo 
32 
41 
31 
45 
55 
46 
32 
55 
44 
58 
5.5 
63 
37 
59 
43 
33 
50 
Average 
annual growth 
rate 2000-
2003 (%) 
Passengers 
52 
54 
58 
43 
57 
56 
50 
47 
47 
43 
45 
54 
56 
62 
67 
55 
52 
Table 17 compares cargo and passenger growth percentages by region for the 
following three years not considering 1999. 
Calculations made from table 14 
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Boeing's world air-cargo facts for 1997 demonstrated the potential of growth for 
the markets mentioned above for the 1994 - 2014 period. As we can see in Table 17 the 
highest rates correspond to those countries located in the corridor (North America, 
Europe and Asia). 
Figure 14 Regional AirFreight markets - growth forecast 1994 - 2014 56 
REGIONAL AIR FREIGHT MARKETS - GROWTH 
FORECAST 1994-2014 
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Perhaps for the last three years the panorama for Air Cargo has been rough but 
1999 turned out to be interesting for world trade and marked the starting point for a 
sustained growth in terms of world's GDP which is expected to average 3% per year 
through 201957. Further on Boeing states that long-term air cargo growth is expected to 
average 6.4% per year (through the year 2019). 
56
 Boeing (2000) "Boeing: Current Market Outlook 2000" www.boeing.com 
57
 Boeing (2000) "World Air Cargo Forecast 2000" www.boeing.com/commercial 
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Table 18 1999 Air cargo growth by market58 
1999 Air Freight Growth by Maior Market 
World 
~> !rryp^-7J;ir*p A n r " ^ 
ASM Noil'l h "PIIU 
run ip—AMI 
irtfra Asia 
It is not surprising that the Asian, North American and European markets showed 
the largest growth percentages for airfreight since a big portion of the manufactured 
goods is originated in these regions. Latin America, Africa and the Middle East are still 
major suppliers of raw materials such as iron, copper, oil, rubber, etc., which are 
preferably transported by surface rather than air. However as the industries of these 
regions increase the output of processed goods (including re-exported goods) the demand 
for air cargo services will also expand. 
In terms of operating revenues, according to ICAO statistics the percentage share 
for cargo operations (not considering mail revenues) grew an average of 3% for the 1993 
through 1997 period whereas the passenger share did not grow at all. Freight revenues 
represent on average 9.8% of scheduled airlines' operating revenue (without mail) and as 
discussed earlier in this chapter the expected growth for air cargo is very optimistic for 
the following five to ten years and therefore the airfreight should no longer be considered 
a by-product. 
Boeing (2000) "World Air Cargo Forecast 2000/200" www.boeing.com 
H 3 . 
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Table 19 World Scheduled Airlines Revenues and Expenses (Millions of US Dollars)* ,59 
World Scheduled Airlines Revenues and Expenses (Millions of US Dollars) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
OPERATING REVENUES (TOTAL) 
Passsenger Revenues 
Freight Revenues 
Mail 
Non - Scheduled Flight Revenues 
OPERATING EXPENSES (TOTAL) 
Flight Operations 
Maintenance and Overhaul 
OPERATING RESULT 
$226,000 
$171,440 
$ 20,270 
$ 2,220 
$ 8,230 
$244,700 
$186,530 
$ 23,890 
$ 2,290 
$ 9,110 
$223,700 $237,000 
$ 59,270 $ 61,350 
$ 22,530 $ 23,770 
$267,000 
$205,000 
$ 25,980 
$ 2,680 
$ 10,680 
$253,500 
$ 66,550 
$ 26,810 
$282,500 
$216,710 
$ 27,830 
$ 2,490 
$ 11,740 
$270,200 
$ 74,810 
$ 28,540 
$291,000 
$ 221,820 
$ 29,720 
$ 2,530 
$ 11,250 
$ 274,700 
$ 76,390 
$ 30,310 
$ 2,300 $ 7,700 $ 13,500 $ 12,300 $ 16,300 
ICAO (1997) 
Table 20 Percentage Distribution of Total Operating Revenues & Expenses60 
Percentage Distribution of Total Operating Revenues & Expenses 
(Millions of US Dollars) 
OPERATING REVENUES (TOTAL) 
Scheduled Services (Total) 
Passsenger Revenues 
Freight Revenues 
Mail 
Non - Scheduled Flight Revenues 
Incidental 
OPERATING EXPENSES (TOTAL) 
Flight Operations (Total) 
Flight Crew Salaries & Expenses 
Aircraft Fuel and Oil 
Other (Insurance, rental training, etc.) 
Maintenance and Overhaul 
Depreciation and Amortization 
User charges and Station Expenses (Total) 
Landing and associated airport fees 
Other 
Pssenger Services 
Ticketing, sales and promotion 
General administrative and other 
1993 
100% 
85.9% 
75.9% 
9.0% 
1.0% 
3.6% 
10.5% 
100% 
26.5% 
7.4% 
12.0% 
7.1% 
10.1% 
7.0% 
17.3% 
4.1% 
13.2% 
10.5% 
16.4% 
12.3% 
1994 
100% 
86.9% 
76.2% 
9.8% 
0.9% 
3.7% 
9.4% 
100% 
25.9% 
7.5% 
11.4% 
7.0% 
10.0% 
7.6% 
17.5% 
4.4% 
13.1% 
10.8% 
15.8% 
12.4% 
1995 
100% 
87.5% 
76.8% 
9.7% 
1.0% 
4.0% 
8.5% 
100% 
26.3% 
7.7% 
11.4% 
7.2% 
10.6% 
7.3% 
18.2% 
4.5% 
13.7% 
11.1% 
15.6% 
11.0% 
1996 
100% 
87.5% 
76.7% 
9.9% 
0.9% 
4.2% 
8.4% 
100% 
27.7% 
7.8% 
12.8% 
7 1% 
10.6% 
7.1% 
17.7% 
4.3% 
13.4% 
10.8% 
15.3% 
10.9% 
1997 
100% 
87.3% 
76.2% 
10.2% 
0.9% 
3.9% 
8.8% 
100% 
27.8% 
7.8% 
12.6% 
7.4% 
11.0% 
6.5% 
17.4% 
4.1% 
13.3% 
10.7% 
14.8% 
11.8% 
ICAO (1997) 
59
 ICAO (1997) "Digest of Statistics - Financial Data" ICAO Publications 
60
 ICAO (1997) "Digest of Statistics - Financial Data" ICAO Publications 
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Tables 19 and 20 explain the world scheduled airlines revenues and expenses in 
dollar figures and the percentage distribution of these from 1993 to 1997. From here it is 
clear to establish that in average the revenues from freight operations (not including mail) 
account for a 9.7% of total operating revenues and around 11% including mail. On the 
other hand we can observe that the growth of air cargo revenues year after year is higher 
than the growth of the passenger side of the business. 
To conclude this part of the analysis I must point out that the panorama for the air 
cargo market is very optimistic for the decade to come not only in terms of volume but 
also in revenues. As shown earlier, for several regions the growth for airfreight is greater 
than the figure for passengers and if capacity is not introduced or optimized to balance 
this situation, the yields for air cargo may be subject to increase. 
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7. CHOOSING A STRATEGY FOR CARGO 
7.1 Three Different Alternatives 
When analyzing their cargo business many passenger airlines find themselves 
with no strategy or facing an undefined position Referring again to Michael Porter61 he 
defines this situation as the "Stuck in the Middle" condition A firm which has not been 
able to define or craft a strategy to deal with the market (competitive) forces more than 
likely would have poor performance as the competition may identify market 
opportunities and work towards taking advantage of them According to Porter a stuck in 
the middle company "lacks the market share, capital investment and resolve to play the 
low-cost game, the industry-wide differentiation necessary to obviate the need for a low 
cost position, or focus to create a differentiation or a low-cost position in a more limited 
sphere" He also states that a firm stuck in the middle is almost guaranteed low 
profitability The reason behind this is that the firm has to deal with competitors that are 
either behind high volume-low cost customers and have developed low cost strategies or 
firms focused on high margin businesses strongly differentiated 
The reviewed material for this study revealed that many airlines had clearly 
defined their business strategy for the passenger operation but in contrast their "stuck in 
the middle" with their cargo business The fact that the air cargo business is a by-product 
of another industry for many airlines, leads to poor business performance which, at the 
same time creates internal corporate conflicts, and makes even harder to establish goals 
or define targets 
61
 Porter M E, Competitive Strategy (1980) "Techniques for analyzing industnes and competitors" Free 
Press, New York 
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Airlines have simply failed to invest in cargo services. In general, cargo managers 
do not have access to the same resources that are allocated to the passenger services. It 
might be because the percentage of the revenues is not comparable but then this leads to 
the chicken and the egg paradox. Managers fail to invest in airfreight because the 
business is not attractive but it may be so because they are reluctant to invest. 
Porter suggests that the problem of getting cough in the middle may mean that the 
focused or differentiated firms (like Lufthansa, British Airways or SwissAir) are the most 
profitable, and the stuck in the middle firms are the least profitable. This implies a U 
shaped relationship between profitability and market share62 
Being aware of the risks of not having a strategy to conduct a business, the 
following are three different approaches an airline may adopt when deciding on whether 
or not to invest in cargo operations. 
• Maintain the status quo (leave as-is and focus in the passenger business) 
• Not to deal with cargo directly and sell the available belly space to a third party 
(becoming a best-cost provider). 
• Invest in cargo operations and develop a separate business unit (becoming a 
differentiated air cargo carrier). 
For a better understanding of the different strategies that the model will suggest 
first it is necessary to describe with more detail the implications of each one of them. 
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7.1.1 Differentiation in Air Cargo 
Michael Porter63 refers to this generic strategy, as the one a firm may adopt to 
differentiate the product or the service creating something that is perceived industry-wide 
as being unique Some of the factors that help in differentiating a product or service 
include technology, brand image, customer service, company network or special features, 
among others In many cases a mix of some of the factors mentioned above is what 
makes the strategy successful In addition and continuing with Porter s reasoning, the 
differentiation strategy (if achieved) it is likely to generate above-average returns in an 
industry because it puts the firm in a stronger position to deal with the competitive forces 
As a result of differentiation (uniqueness) this strategy generates consumer loyalty and 
also creates barriers of entry for other competitors 
In the air cargo business implementing a differentiation strategy implies that the 
earner has to develop a brand or identity to be recognized and seen as one entity in the 
market It also implies to develop technologies, standards and procedures to deliver a 
unique type of service In order to be successful the airline has to go beyond the 
transportation part in the logistic process Today it is know-how and competence with 
regard to the integration of the transport and information chain that comes first In the 
airfreight industry the more value added steps a earner can offer in the logistic process 
the higher the value perceived by the customer64 According to Mark Shields65 "since the 
air cargo faces an industrial rather than a retail marketing challenge, it is to be hoped that 
62
 Porter M E , Competitive Strategy (1980) "Techniques for analyzing industnes and competitors" Free 
Press, New York 
63
 Porter M E, Competitive Strategy (1980) "Techniques for analyzing industnes and competitors" Free 
Press, New York 
64
 Herrmann, Trefzger and Crux (1998) "Challenges for Tomorrow's Successful Air Freight Providers" 
Aviation Week Publications 
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customers will be more rational. It is to be hoped that they will be quicker to recognize 
actual service improvements and reward the earner making such efforts with positive 
market share and price premiums". 
To properly implement a differentiation strategy the cargo business has to be 
developed further to provide value in every step, from receiving to delivering. 
Figure 15 Cargo flow according to service supplier .66 
Supplier / 
manager 
^F 
Carrier 
Forwarder 
Integrator 
f Origin 1 y 
Acceptance 3 ^ \ Handling ^ , Transport ^ . Handling ^ \ Delivery 
Carrier Carrier Carrier 
)
 Handling 
Agent 
1
 Agent / 
Forwder 
I Forwarder ^ \ Carrier > Handling Agent Carrier Carrier > Handling Agent Forwrder 
> 
Integrator Integrator^ Integrator^ Integrator >\ Integratr 
Figure 15 shows the different players involved in the transportation process from 
origin to destination. Integrator companies like Federal Express or DHL are directly 
responsible for each step thus being able to offer a complete logistic solution. They have 
developed technologies and processes to ensure that the product reaches its destination 
where and when the customer is expecting it and in proper condition. In addition because 
this companies are in control of the whole process they are able to gather detailed 
65
 Shields M (1998) "The Changing Cargo Business" Aviation Week Publications 
66
 Source Roland Berger & Partners, adapted from Shields M (1998) "The Changing Cargo Business" 
Aviation Week Publications 
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information about any particular shipping which gives them a powerful advantage over 
other service providers that still rely on third party companies to report a shipment status. 
Several carriers provide the first level of service ("Carrier" from Figure 15) which 
consists in transporting the shipment from point A to point B on an airport to airport basis 
however in some few cases they may have subcontracted companies to take care of the 
cargo acceptance, handling and delivery. Even when this is the case, generally a freight 
forwarder is the one being responsible for the shipment acceptance, handling and 
delivery, leaving the airline responsible for the air transportation function only thus 
taking away a big chunk of the value. 
From figure 15 we can also establish that the more services a carrier provide 
besides the pure "transport" function, the more value it can add to the process. A carrier 
could shift from being a simple airport to airport transporter to become a business partner 
offering a one-stop logistic solution. By developing customer valued services like 
shipment tracking, customs processing, in-land pick up and delivery and providing 
definite arrival times, the carrier is in position to increase market share and improve 
profitability by differentiating from regular non integrated transporters. There are several 
alternatives to offer those customer-valued activities all at once (a one-stop solution) but 
it depends significantly on the firm's ability to integrate seamlessly the different players 
involved in the process. 
The common denominator in any attempt to offer a differentiated product is 
investment. Time, people and resources are necessary to transform the regular non-value 
adding processes into value generating activities, which are recognized as that by the 
87 
customer. Figure 16 represents the importance of shipper service attributes measured 
from 0 to 100 being 0 not important and 100 most important. 
Figure 16 Importance of shipper service attributes67 
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7.1.2 Cost Leadership in Air Cargo 
To be successful in implementing this strategy the firm must work hard to 
establish a set of functional policies aimed to the basic objective of controlling costs and 
keep them relatively low when compared to competitors. According to Michael Porter68 
"cost leadership requires aggressive construction of efficient scale facilities, vigorous 
pursuit of cost reductions from experience, tight cost and overhead control, avoidance of 
marginal consumer accounts, and cost minimization in areas like research and 
development, service, sales force, advertising and so on". With the same reasoning he 
67
 Source: Mercer Shipper Survey. Adapted from Shields M. (1998) "The Changing Cargo Business" 
Aviation Week Publications 
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suggests that a company implementing this strategy may enjoy above average returns in 
its industry despite the presence of strong competitive forces. Porter also suggests that a 
low cost strategy defend the firm against powerful buyers who can exert power only to 
drive down prices to the level of the next most efficient competitor (in this case freight 
forwarders). 
In the cargo business implementing a cost leadership strategy implies providing a 
convenient transportation alternative at below industry average cost. If after following the 
analysis proposed in the decision tree an airline finds the differentiation strategy 
inappropriate then it could still profit from the cargo business by implementing a low cost 
strategy. In order to do this the airline must be able to fully identify and allocate the costs 
of providing available belly space and take some steps towards reducing them. The 
second stage includes determining a target profit level for the available belly space for 
cargo. In other words the airline must be certain of the minimum attractive revenue 
expected for a given ATM (Available Ton-Miles) or ATK (Available Ton-Kilometers) 
capacity or target load factor. Once this is accomplished the carrier will offer its capacity 
to alliance airline partners or freight forwarders and attempt to close long term contracts 
to sell as much capacity as possible to ensure reaching a minimum load factor or a 
minimum required level of revenue. 
Freight forwarders are the major buyers of airlines' cargo holding capacity and 
therefore they have strong negotiating power. Instead of struggling against competitors 
for small marginal revenues from cargo, a canier can ensure it achieves targeted revenue 
levels from cargo operations by selling its belly space through long term contracts. The 
68
 Porter M.E., Competitive Strategy (1980) "Techniques for analyzing industries and competitors" Free 
Press, New York 
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key to establish long term contracts is to run a reliable operation, providing attractive 
capacity levels in dynamic markets while ensuring a competitive low price. The carrier 
may benefit from a consistent somehow fixed stream of revenues while also achieving 
high aircraft utilization without large investments in people, resources or time consuming 
processes. Even though this strategy does not require as much investment as the 
differentiation one, the airline should re-organize its cargo division in a different business 
unit in order to accomplish some of the following: 
• To allocate the costs associated with providing the service properly 
• To optimize aircraft utilization by celebrating long term agreements with alliance 
airline partners or freight forwarders 
• To negotiate terms and craft price strategies to ensure long term contracts 
• To provide the airline with a clear predictable stream of revenues while at the same 
time help in controlling the division's cost structure. 
7.1.3 Leave As-Is 
Some airlines may consider that their current cargo potential is not attractive 
enough to venture in implementing any of the two mentioned strategies. These carriers 
may determine that instead of struggling with a non-core activity "too big to die, too 
small to justify major investments" they rather focus their resources in the passenger 
operations leaving the cargo business as a by-product. Since this alternative is not the 
purpose of this study because implies maintaining the status quo I will not enter in further 
detail. 
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8. DECISION MODEL TO EVALUATE A STRATEGY FOR CARGO 
For an airline to evaluate the feasibility and applicability of each of the mentioned 
alternatives, I present a decision model tree that may serve as a support tool for the 
management when facing the dilemma of whether or not to invest in the air cargo 
business. 
Figure 17 Decision Tree for Strategy Evaluation 
Air 
Cargo 
STATUS QUO ANALYSIS 
Develop Cargo Strategy 
' Perform Network 
Analysis 
Leave As-Is 
NETWORK ANALYSIS 
Favorable 
f Perform Regional 
Analysis 
Unfavorable 
Perform Regional 
Analysis 
REGIONAL ANALYSIS 
Favorable 
Evaluate Partners 
Unfavorable 
0-
Evaluate Partners 
Favorable 
Evaluate Partners 
Unfavorable 
Leave As-Is 
BUSINESS PARTNERS 
ANALYSIS 
Differentiated 
Favorable 
Differentiated 
Unfavorable 
Best Cost Provider 
Favorable 
Best Cost Provider 
Unfavorable 
Leave As-Is 
For a better understanding of the decision tree exposed in Figure 17 I divided the 
model in four stages. The first stage corresponds to an analysis of the cunent strategy for 
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its air cargo business if the airline has any. The second stage suggests an evaluation of the 
airline's network including its fleet and route structure. A third stage evaluates the 
economic outlook of the regions or countries in the airline's network and also provides 
world economic trends. The final stage analyzes the airline's alliance partners in terms of 
available capacity, network and overall performance. 
After each stage has been explained I will provide airline results from 5 
International carriers to prove a point. From 1992 through 1998 all of these carriers 
decided to implement a strategy for air cargo under a different business unit. In order to 
prove the hypothesis I will compare the historic results against average industry figures 
and also will contrast them on a before-after scenario. This analysis will lead to the 
conclusion that having a defined strategy for the cargo business, under a different 
business unit increases cargo revenues and boosts operational profits. 
8.1 First Stage - Status Quo Analysis 
As explained earlier, this stage implies performing a self-analysis of the cunent 
situation of the air cargo business in the airline to identify whether or not a strategy has 
been implemented. 
After evaluating the actual strategy for the cargo operation an airline that has not 
done this exercise in the past, may find itself in a "stuck in the middle" situation or with 
an undefined strategy according to Porter. Since the main concern of a passenger carrier 
is the passenger business, more than likely it will have a strategy for it but not for freight 
operations independently. 
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The core of the first stage deals directly 
with acknowledging the cunent situation of the 
carrier towards its cargo operation. It can only 
have two different outcomes. One is identifying 
a "stuck in the middle" situation or two, a 
defined business strategy independent from the 
one of the passenger business. At this point the 
management has to decide whether or not to 
maintain the status quo by evaluating the 
alternative of investing in the air cargo 
operation by developing a defined strategy in a 
different business unit. 
Figure 18 First Stage 
STATUS QUO ANALYSIS 
Air 
Cargo 
Develop Cargo Strateg 
Perform Network 
Analysis 
i 
, Leave As-Is 
As explained in the last chapter, there 
are three different alternatives (strategies) 
passenger airlines may adopt to deal with the air 
cargo business. They may either choose a 
differentiation strategy, a best-cost provider approach or focus on the passenger business 
leaving the cargo operation as-is (more than likely "stuck in the middle"). 
Since the first stage is only a self-awareness analysis meant to identify an existing 
situation (business strategy with regard to the air cargo business), it is necessary to 
develop reliable information tools and reporting systems to evaluate actual performance. 
These tools will enable the airline's management to make a structured decision based on 
facts and real data. 
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The presented model will often refer to five leader airlines who decided to spin 
off their cargo operations and dedicate time, and resources to develop a different business 
unit. The list of carriers and a brief description of their business are presented below. 
British Airways World Cargo 
British Airways World Cargo is one of the largest cargo carriers in the world, 
with more than 500 destinations in over 100 countries. World Cargo was the first 
department within British Airways to be made a separate business unit, with its own 
strategic planning and direction, budget and profitability. In early October of 1992 the 
company decided to create the World Air Cargo brand to identify the cargo services and 
place greater emphasis on this operation. 1993 was a transition year and in 1994 the 
business unit was fully operational producing £518 million towards the airline revenues 
and transported 666.000 Tonnes of freight and mail. 
Lufthansa Cargo 
Lufthansa Cargo has been an independent business unit within the Lufthansa 
Group since January of 1998. In 1997 it performed 6.15 billion of Tonne Kilometers of 
freight. With Revenue Ton Kilometers of 14,763 million69 in 1999 the airline is the leader 
in the international airfreight business. Lufthansa Cargo operates its own freighter fleet 
including 747 F's and MD 1 lF's. In addition it uses the bellies of the passenger fleet 
which operates around 300 aircraft. Even though the business unit was recently created, 
the airline's strategy for cargo was defined in the late 80's70. 
WWW.Lufthansa. com (2000) "The Company - Investor Relations" 
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Swiss Air Logistics 
Swiss Air created its separate business unit for cargo operations in 1997 after 
taking over all the belly capacity of Sabena Airlines of Belgium71. The company 
introduced SwissCargo to become a global player in the air cargo business. "Within two 
years of agreeing to market Sabena's entire belly-hold capacity, Swissair doubled its 
cargo. From this initial venture the Swissair group is developing new businesses like 
SairLogistics and SwissGlobalCargo. 
United's Worldwide Cargo 
In the first quarter of 1997 United launched the Worlwide Cargo freighter 
operation. The company's cargo division became independent in terms of strategic 
planning budgeting and management. By initially operating four DC 10 dedicated 
freighters the airline showed its interest in a commitment to cargo operations. United 
operates the largest passenger aircraft fleet in the world and it is also the second largest 
domestic cargo canier after Federal Express according to Table 4. 
Japan Airlines Super Logistics 
Japan Airlines Cargo was made a different business unit in late 1996 by renaming 
the service JAL Super Logistics and moving to a different building with independent 
management72. The company is the sixth largest cargo canier in the world. It transported 
4,174 millions of Scheduled Freight Tone Kilometers (STFK) in 1997 according to Table 
2. JAL Super Logistics directly links 65 cities in 24 countries around the world. The 
company continues to develop transportation lines that meet the needs of each region, and 
to support international distribution in order to implement its global distribution 
70
 www.lufthansa.com 
71
 Air Cargo World (1999) "How Sawonderful SAir?" November 1999 
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strategy73. Also joint operations with partner airlines and trucking services expand the 
JAL Super Logistics network. 
8.2 Second Stage - Network Analysis 
As stated earlier this analysis consists in the evaluation of the airline's network 
including its fleet and route structure. At this point the management has to be decided 
about considering the possibility of investing in the air cargo business by developing a 
clear strategy and not maintaining the status quo (leave the cargo business As-Is). 
• Fleet Analysis. An essential step towards unveiling the potential of the air cargo 
business for an airline starts with the analysis of its own type of fleet and its belly-
holding capacity. By looking at the total number of aircraft, the percentage of wide 
bodies over nanow bodies and the average age of them the airline may have an initial 
taste of the potential of the business. For the air cargo business to be appealing the 
airline must have a suitable fleet with enough belly-holding capacity to accommodate 
various types of freight and offer a low cost per traveled distance (ATK). 
To illustrate the process of fleet analysis Table 12 conesponds to the historic fleet 
composition for the selected carriers. It is important to notice the elevated percentage of 
wide body aircraft per airline and the trend towards acquiring more these aircraft as a 
result of the commitment of these carriers with international travel. 
72
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Table 21 Fleet Composition for Selected Airlines74 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Total Fleet 
JAL 
LH 
SAir 
UAL 
BA 
Wide Body 
JAL 
LH 
SAir 
UAL 
BA 
Narrow Body 
JAL 
LH 
SAir 
UAL 
BA 
% Wide Body 
JAL 
LH 
SAir 
UAL 
BA 
119 
219 
63 
554 
230 
119 
66 
28 
143 
99 
0 
141 
35 
411 
131 
100% 
30% 
44% 
26% 
43% 
124 
213 
65 
556 
228 
122 
67 
23 
138 
101 
2 
146 
42 
418 
127 
98% 
31% 
35% 
25% 
44% 
128 
207 
61 
568 
229 
125 
62 
24 
143 
101 
3 
145 
37 
425 
128 
98% 
30% 
39% 
25% 
44% 
136 
210 
61 
575 
248 
130 
67 
26 
153 
117 
6 
143 
35 
422 
131 
96% 
32% 
43% 
27% 
47% 
139 
218 
70 
577 
261 
134 
71 
33 
153 
128 
5 
147 
37 
424 
133 
96% 
33% 
47% 
27% 
49% 
After evaluating the fleet composition and determining the initial potential for cargo 
holding a second step must be taken and is to analyze the company's route structure. 
• Route Structure. At this point we need to determine the percentage of international 
flights, the average stage length and the type of destinations. In general international 
flights demand more belly space for cargo than domestic routes due to three basic 
factors: distance involved which makes air cargo more appealing; economic activity 
(trade) and reduced number of participants, because domestic flights compete with 
other established airlines, truck companies and trains. 
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The average stage length is a good indication of the potential for the air cargo 
business. Because the key advantage of the service is time savings (speed) the longer 
the distance between origin and destination points the more likely a shipper will 
employ air transportation (for suitable goods). 
The last factor involves determining the type of destinations and the percentage of 
each within the route structure. They could be either leisure or business destinations. 
The more industrialized countries or regions with dynamic economy the company 
includes in its route structure, the higher the demand for air cargo services. 
To illustrate the route structure analysis, the following tables contain information of 
the five selected carriers. 
Table 22 Stage Length (in kilometers) for Selected Carriers75 
Stage Length (In Kilometers) 
INTERNATIONAL JAL(UNITS) LH (UNITS) SAir (UNITS) UAL (UNITS) BA (UNITS) 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
DOMESTIC 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
4,536 
4,598 
4,575 
4,612 
4,703 
4,869 
4,888 
4,865 
4,896 
807 
806 
813 
814 
805 
784 
770 
770 
790 
74
 The Airline Monitor (October 1999) 
75
 ICAO (1998) "Die ;est of Statistics - ' 
1,981 
1,721 
1,656 
1,540 
1,556 
1,610 
1,637 
1,626 
1,629 
292 
371 
391 
396 
391 
392 
396 
389 
380 
1,290 
1,323 
1,378 
1,439 
1,364 
1,366 
1,447 
1,375 
1,427 
184 
182 
179 
183 
175 
199 
184 
171 
175 
rraffic" ICAO Publications 
4,214 
4,306 
4,261 
3,985 
4,079 
4,411 
4,851 
5,030 
5,191 
1,297 
1,301 
1,278 
1,296 
1,351 
1,406 
1,383 
1,409 
1,430 
1,746 
1,800 
1,882 
2,028 
2,207 
2,368 
2,439 
2,520 
2,625 
386 
392 
400 
400 
406 
414 
420 
431 
456 
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Table 22 explains why some caniers are not strong in domestic cargo operations, 
as the stage length for them is short enough for shippers to consider other surface 
transportation alternatives such as trains or trucks. The majority of the air cargo flies 
internationally where the distances tend to be considerable high and the time savings over 
surface transportation alternatives are enormous. Because almost all of the selected 
carriers conespond to the flag airlines (of their respective country) their nature is to focus 
more on international travel thus their interest in developing the air cargo business. 
In Europe where surface transportation networks are highly developed (trains 
systems and trucking companies) and travel distances are somehow short, providing air 
cargo services is not attractive unless one can provide and efficient system at low cost 
comparable to the surface transportation. 
Table 23 Number of departures of selected airlines76 
Number of Departures 
INTERNATIONAL JAL(UNITS) LH (UNITS) SAir (UNITS) UAL (THOUS) BA (THOUS) 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
DOMESTIC 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
44,028 
42,712 
43,664 
45,506 
44,178 
46,417 
50,695 
53,565 
55,473 
UNITS 
49,023 
50,527 
55,290 
58,551 
64,053 
69,717 
83,766 
87,677 
88,809 
143,354 
196,468 
214,965 
249,015 
251,035 
257,367 
270,469 
287,079 
302,797 
UNITS 
144,443 
119,876 
158,927 
178,969 
179,393 
178,080 
186,572 
183,213 
194,130 
94,612 
97,548 
93,706 
96,159 
105,018 
109,549 
92,652 
122,166 
121,334 
UNITS 
19,692 
20,496 
18,826 
17,746 
17,110 
17,639 
14,457 
16,809 
12,392 
28 
36 
46 
68 
76 
73 
67 
67 
68 
(THOUS) 
593 
618 
644 
653 
669 
657 
713 
718 
730 
185 
195 
178 
180 
179 
174 
173 
177 
176 
(THOUS) 
70 
74 
70 
70 
69 
70 
69 
65 
57 
ICAO (1998) "Digest of Statistics - Traffic" ICAO Publications 
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Table 24 Ratio of International Flights for Selected Airlines 
Ratio of International Flights 
Total JAL LH SAir UAL BA 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
47% 
46% 
44% 
44% 
41% 
40% 
38% 
38% 
38% 
50% 
62% 
57% 
58% 
58% 
59% 
59% 
61% 
61% 
83% 
83% 
83% 
84% 
86% 
86% 
87% 
88% 
91% 
5% 
6% 
7% 
9% 
10% 
10% 
9% 
9% 
9% 
73% 
72% 
72% 
72% 
72% 
71% 
71% 
73% 
76% 
Table 24 indicates the proportion of international flights for the selected carriers 
in which it is clear to observe the dedication of Lufthansa, SwissAir and British Airways 
to serve international destinations. This is a favorable indication for a carrier evaluating 
its cargo potential. 
• Network Analysis: this process implies looking at the fleet and the route structure 
together to evaluate the potential for air cargo in terms of cunent supply, actual 
demand and the its associated costs. From this analysis the carrier can determine the 
real volume of belly-holding offered to the market, in which destinations at what cost. 
It can also calculate the actual demand in terms of load factor and the aircraft 
utilization. 
Some useful indicators to calculate the earner's supply of belly capacity are: 
[Cargo ATK / Number of departures! 
Will provide a figure of capacity per departure (system capacity). 
[Total ATK for cargo / International ATK for cargo) 
Provides a measure of cargo capacity in international destinations 
fcargo ATK / Stage Length) 
100 
Provides a figure to evaluate the amount of capacity per traveled distance. 
The following calculations may be used to analyze the cunent demand for cargo 
services. 
Actual Cargo RTK 
Provides the amount of weight actually transported by the airline. 
{(RTK (Cargo) / Number of Aircraft)/ ATK (per departure)}/ 365 
Provides aircraft usage in number of flights per day performed, to transport the actual 
number of Cargo RTK's. 
Cargo ATK / Cargo RTK performed 
Provides a percentage for cargo load factor 
To conclude the following calculations can be used to determine the cost of 
providing the actual cargo service 
DOC / ATK for Cargo 
Provides the direct operating cost of supplying cargo capacity per Ton per Kilometer 
{DOC / ATK for Cargo}/ Number of departures! 
Provides the direct operating cost of supplying cargo capacity per Ton per Kilometer 
on a departure basis. 
The above calculations must be performed to evaluate the potential of the actual 
network for cargo operations. A positive or favorable result indicates that the company 
should develop a differentiated strategy based on the strength given by its own operation. 
If on the other hand these calculations indicate an unfavorable condition for cargo 
operations a best cost provider strategy should be implemented by selling the available 
belly capacity to other carriers or freight forwarders, as explained earlier in this study. 
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The following tables illustrate the calculations mentioned above for the selected 
carriers. 
Table 25 shows the number of aircraft departures for the 5 carriers selected. The 
bold figures represent the years the airline started the operation of the air cargo business 
in a different unit. These figures make more sense after they are combined with route 
information to evaluate capacity in critical routes with high potential for cargo growth 
and to determine possible imbalances. 
Table 25 Available Tonnes Kilometers for Cargo per Departure77 
Available Tonnes Kilometers for Cargo per Departure 
Year 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
AVG 
JAL-(Thous) LH 
51.47 
52.30 
52.09 
48.40 
42.40 
42.47 
39.66 
38.81 
40.22 
45.31 
- Thous Sair • 
19.43 
19.45 
16.26 
14.73 
15.19 
16.76 
17.92 
18.49 
17.86 
17.34 
Thous 
11.58 
11.75 
12.85 
14.67 
14.52 
14.18 
15.30 
14.43 
16.65 
13.99 
UAL - (Mill) 
5.94 
6.55 
4.89 
8.26 
9.35 
9.75 
9.65 
10.14 
11.53 
8.45 
BA - (Mill) 
13.82 
13.08 
14.56 
15.95 
16.86 
18.61 
21.00 
22.33 
25.76 
18.00 
Table 24 shows the impact of an airline's fleet in its cargo holding capacity. The 
above figures demonstrate that those carriers with higher percentage of wide body aircraft 
in their fleet are able to offer more lifting capacity for air cargo. JAL fcs wide body fleet 
ratio averaged 98% for the period of 1994 through 1998 and therefore its impressive 
amount of Available Tonne Kilometers for Cargo per Departure, which averaged 45.31 
for the period of 1989 through 1997. 
Calculations made from ICAO Digest of Statistics - Traffic 
Table 26 Percentage of International ATK for Cargo for Selected Airlines 
Percentage of International ATK for Cargo 
Year 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
JAL 
97% 
96% 
95% 
95% 
94% 
94% 
94% 
94% 
94% 
LH 
97% 
97% 
97% 
97% 
97% 
97% 
97% 
97% 
97% 
SAir 
99% 
99% 
99% 
99% 
99% 
99% 
99% 
100% 
100% 
UAL 
20% 
30% 
45% 
47% 
50% 
53% 
54% 
56% 
58% 
BA 
99% 
99% 
98% 
98% 
99% 
99% 
99% 
100% 
100% 
Except for United Airlines, Table 26 shows the clear orientation towards 
international markets for the cargo business. As I mentioned before, the availability of 
cargo capacity in international routes represents a measure of potential to develop the 
business further. 
Table 27 shows the evolution of the cargo load factor for the selected carriers in 
which we can observe the low utilization of capacity in domestic routes. This condition 
matches with what I mentioned earlier with regard to stage lengths and the time 
advantages provided for air cargo. In domestic operations specially when competing with 
efficient surface transportation alternatives the advantages of shipping by air are not as 
evident. 
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Table 27 Cargo Load Factor for Selected Carriers78 
Cargo Load Factors 
INTERNATIONAL 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
DOMESTIC 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
JAL 
76% 
72% 
67% 
66% 
74% 
75% 
73% 
73% 
74% 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
LH 
72% 
68% 
72% 
72% 
75% 
78% 
75% 
72% 
72% 
31% 
30% 
32% 
30% 
29% 
28% 
29% 
31% 
27% 
SAir 
71% 
71% 
69% 
67% 
73% 
81% 
78% 
78% 
77% 
48% 
43% 
46% 
48% 
52% 
56% 
60% 
56% 
48% 
UAL 
78% 
58% 
68% 
45% 
46% 
47% 
49% 
48% 
50% 
46% 
44% 
68% 
40% 
38% 
37% 
38% 
38% 
39% 
BA 
63% 
67% 
65% 
64% 
66% 
68% 
63% 
64% 
65% 
16% 
17% 
12% 
11% 
6% 
11% 
10% 
29% 
12% 
The aircraft utilization is a good indicator of performance and provides the 
management with a tool to evaluate opportunities to increase the air cargo load. When the 
airline route structure includes several points in a reduced distance radius, the high 
utilization compensates the relatively low load factor levels for cargo as seen in Table 27. 
On the other hand long haul flights enjoy relatively high load factors but at the expense of 
low aircraft utilization. 
Table 28 Departures per Aircraft per Day to Achieve Reported RTK's79 
Aircraft Utilization (for cargo) 
Year 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
JAL 
1.7 
1.7 
1.7 
1.8 
LH 
3.6 
4.0 
5.0 
5.6 
SAir 
5.5 
4.6 
5.5 
5.2 
UAL 
2.5 
2.5 
3.4 
2.4 
BA 
2.6 
2.9 
2.8 
2.7 
Calculations made from ICAO Digest of Statistics - Traffic 
Calculations made from ICAO Digest of Statistics - Traffic 
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Table 29 Cost Based on Capacity and Stage Length (US $)80 
Cost Based on Capacity and Stage Length (US $) 
Year 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
$ 
$ 
$ 
JAL 
86,334.38 
95,067.51 
99,161.75 
$ 103,060.82 
$ 
$ 
90,662.12 
87,685.26 
LH 
$ 36,258.89 
$30,151.99 
$26,823.52 
$22,396.87 
$23,580.25 
$21,517.66 
SAir 
N/A 
N/A 
$ 26,236.09 
$ 30,215.53 
$ 28,085.29 
$ 25,806.68 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
UAL 
21,289.86 
21,496.48 
19,382.87 
19,504.60 
20,384.59 
22,068.04 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
BA 
30,192.16 
29,472.86 
34,712.71 
34,842.84 
37,056.33 
46,018.85 
Figure 30 provides the cost of the available cargo space per trip for the selected 
carriers; the bold figures indicate the years the airline started operating its cargo business 
in a separate unit. 
Table 30 shows the evolution of cost per ATK for the selected carriers. This 
figure is affected by variations in fuel prices, cost of labor and aircraft rent or lease 
conditions. It also changes with the amount of cargo belly-holding and stage length. 
Table 30 Direct Operating Costs per Cargo ATK (US $)81 
Direct Operating Costs per Cargo ATK (US $) 
Year 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
JAL 
1.68 
1.82 
1.90 
2.13 
2.14 
2.06 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
LH 
1.87 
1.55 
1.65 
1.52 
1.55 
1.28 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
SAir 
N/A 
N/A 
2.04 
2.06 
1.93 
1.82 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
UAL 
3.59 
3.28 
3.97 
2.36 
2.18 
2.26 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
BA 
2.18 
2.25 
2.38 
2.18 
2.20 
2.47 
80
 Calculations made from ICAO Digest of Statistics - Traffic 
81
 Idem 
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To conclude the analysis of the Second Stage I must 
say that there are no good or bad indicators or ratios to 
evaluate the air cargo business potential. Instead, a proper 
combination of them may reveal where the good 
opportunities so the management can decide whether or not 
to develop a strategy for air cargo and which one. 
If after evaluating the airline's network a favorable 
condition exists, a "Regional Analysis" must be performed to 
determine its potential for implementing a differentiated 
strategy and take advantage of the "uniqueness" of its 
operational characteristics. If on the other hand the balance is 
not favorable, then a "Regional" and a "Business Partners" 
analysis would help in determining the best strategy to 
implement. 
8.3 Third Stage - Regional Analysis 
This process implies evaluating the economic situation of the different regions the 
carrier flies to in terms of economic growth (GDP), commercial trade increase among 
neighboring cities/countries, major economic activities and the existence of other 
transportation alternatives providing the same type of service in the region. 
The following figures must be reviewed to assess the potential for air cargo 
markets by region. 
Figure 19 Second Stage 
N E T W O R K ANALYSIS 
Favorable 
/
Perform Regional 
Analysis 
\ Unfavorable 
Perform Regional 
Analysis 
• Cargo traffic outbound and inbound at country level, region level and city pair level. 
for the actual route structure 
• GDP of the regions within the network. 
• Number of carriers already operating in those countries and their approximate holding 
capacity. 
• Type of industries of the regions within the network 
• Number of Established Cargo Agents 
If favorable conditions exist that means that the carrier flies within growing 
economically active regions where the demand for air cargo services is increasing. It also 
implies that the city pairs within the network link attractive destinations for shippers 
where the speed and time advantages of air transportation are valued. 
Also the type of industries of the regions within the network play an important 
role because depending of the nature of goods produced the demand for air transportation 
may be affected. Regions with low production of perishables or technology related 
products might not be as attractive as regions with massive productions of these goods, 
which demand air cargo services. Countries with developed "processing goods" 
industries are considered to have high potential of demand for air transportation solutions 
because of the cost advantages provided (just-in-time inventory, warehousing, time to 
market issues, etc.) 
If we go back and look Table 11 we can clearly identify the most attractive 
markets in terms of cargo movement which are located in Western Europe, North 
America, Northeast and Southeast Asia. Airlines operating between these regions may 
have above average cargo revenues due to the volume of activity. Even though some 
regions expenence more movement than others, the expected growth rate of some of 
them unveils new opportunities for those earners already established and for new ones to 
come 
In conclusion If a earner has a considerable proportion of its network covenng the 
routes and regions desenbed in chapter 6 then a favorable condition exists for it to 
develop a differentiation strategy for its air cargo business If on the other hand the 
earner's network is established outside the regions mentioned in chapter 6, or in regions 
with poor economic performance, then an unfavorable condition exists In order to 
consider the investment in developing a strategy for air cargo an analysis of the airline's 
alliance partners should be performed 
The following chart shows the forecasted growth rate for air freight from 1999 
through 2003 and its relation with the selected earners in terms of major destination 
points 
Table 31 Major Regions of Cargo Operations for Selected Carners and their Growth 
Rate82 
Region Name Average annual growth rate Carreirs with major 
2000-2003 (%) cargo operations 
RegName 
Central Asia 
Central/West Africa 
Eastern Africa 
Eastern/Cent Europe 
Middle East 
North America 
Northeast Asia 
South Asia 
Southeast Asia 
Western Europe 
Cargo 
31 
45 
55 
46 
55 
58 
55 
63 
59 
50 
Carriers 
JAL7LH 
BA/LH 
LH/BA 
LH/BA/Sair/ 
LH/BA/SAir 
UAMJH/BA/Sair/JAL 
JALAJAL/BA/LH/SAir 
JAL/UAL7BA/LH/SAir 
JALyUAL7BA/LH/SAir 
LH/BA/Sair/JALVUAL 
IATA (1999) "Air Cargo Annual" and "Freight Forecast 1999 - 2003" IATA Publications July 1999 
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Figure 20 Third Stage 
A favorable result in the Regional Analysis ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
Favorable 
Differentiated 
Unfavorable 
Evaluate Partners 
Favorable 
Evaluate Partners 
Unfavorable 
Leave As-Is 
after a favorable result in the Network Analysis 
implies that the market conditions in the cities or 
countries surrounding a point of the airlines route 
structure are optimistic and appropriate for the 
development of the region's cargo business. In 
addition it implies that established competitors have 
not developed a strategy yet or there is still potential 
for new ventures. In addition it implies that the airline 
is suited to serve the market since its network is able 
to provide the required capacity to the proper 
destinations. At this point the airline should 
implement a Differentiated Strategy without going 
further in the decision tree. If on the other hand an unfavorable condition exists for this 
stage, an evaluation of the business partners is necessary to determine the right strategy to 
implement 
A different scenario arises when the prior stage yields an unfavorable result 
meaning that the airline's Network lacks the required capacity for the required 
destinations or the route structure itself is not attractive enough. In this case if the 
Regional Analysis is favorable, it is necessary to go further in the decision tree to 
evaluate business partners. On the other hand if the Regional Analysis is unfavorable, to 
maintain the status quo is the suggested alternative. 
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8.4 Fourth Stage - Business Partners Analysis 
This stage should be evaluated only in the case that the results of the analysis of 
the Third stage are favorable but the evaluation of the Second Stage is unfavorable. It is 
necessary to evaluate business partners to determine if they can either "make up" for the 
weaknesses of the carrier's network or the regional economic factors associated with it. 
In this case the carrier should look at the current cargo strategy of the allied 
carriers and perform this same tree analysis for each of them to determine favorable or 
unfavorable conditions for the cargo business. By evaluating the partner's cunent cargo 
strategy, network and economic the factors of the regions within that network, we can 
determine whether to invest in a differentiated strategy for the cargo business and of what 
type. 
In the case of the selected carriers they all belong to large alliance groups of 
carriers and cargo agents to provide a differentiated service. 
Table 32 Selected Carriers Alliance Group 
| Airline 
JAL 
LH 
SAir 
UAL 
BA 
Alliance Name 
N/A 
Star Alliance 
Qualiflyer 
Star Alliance 
One World | 
To explain better the Fourth Stage, Figure 21 provides a picture of the complete 
decision tree. If the analysis of the alliance partners turns out to be favorable then an 
investment in the air cargo business must be considered but the strategy for it will depend 
on the results of the analysis of the previous stages. 
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Figure 21 Decision Tree 
STATUS QUO ANALYSIS 
Air 
Cargo 
Develop Cargo Strategy 
f Perform Network 
Analysis 
I Leave As-Is 
NETWORK ANALYSIS 
Favorable 
j Perform Regional 
Analysis 
I Unfavorable 
Perform Regional 
Analysis 
REGIONAL ANALYSIS 
Favorable 
Evaluate Partners 
Unfavorable 
O-
Evaluate Partners 
Favorable 
Evaluate Partners 
Unfavorable 
Leave As-is 
BUSINESS PARTNERS 
ANALYSIS 
Differentiated 
Favorable 
Differentiated 
Unfavorable 
Best Cost Provider 
Favorable 
Best Cost Provider 
Unfavorable 
Leave As-Is 
8.5 Selected Carriers Performance 
The carriers selected for the study are examples of successful implementation of 
strategies for cargo. The fact that these caniers developed a differentiation strategy for 
the cargo business indicates that they recognized the operational advantages of their 
network, the economic prosperity of the regions covered by it and the convenience of 
their alliance partners. 
The common denominator in all of the selected carriers is the creation of a 
different business unit for cargo. 
i l l 
The following tables show a comparison of the performance of the selected 
carriers in the cargo business as compared to other major industry players. 
Table 33 Cargo Load Factors of Selected Caniers Compared1 83 
Iota! 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
Total 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
Cargo 
Load Factor 
BA 
% 
65% 
68% 
63% 
63% 
65% 
USAIR 
% 
25% 
23% 
20% 
21% 
24% 
Cargo 
Load Factor 
JAL 
0/ 
76% 
77% 
74% 
74% 
75% 
AIR CANADA 
% 
48% 
46% 
46% 
49% 
51% 
Cargo 
Load Factor 
LUFTHA 
73% 
76% 
73% 
71% 
71% 
VIRGIN 
% 
39% 
43% 
45% 
46% 
48% 
Cargo 
Load Factor 
SWISSA 
% 
73% 
81% 
78% 
78% 
77% 
DELTA 
% 
35% 
40% 
38% 
38% 
40% 
Cargo 
Load Factor 
UAL 
0/ 
42% 
43% 
44% 
44% 
45% 
ANA j 
% 
55% 
45% 
55% 
31% 
33% 
Table 33 shows the load factors for cargo of the selected carriers compared with 
other international carriers for the 1993 through 1997 period. British Airways, Lufthansa, 
Japan Airlines, and SwissAir all have above average load factors. United Airlines started 
to implement its strategy in 1996 and therefore no major changes can be appreciated. On 
the other hand, regular international carriers with no strategy for cargo during that period 
suffered from low load factors from cargo operations. 
Calculations made from ICAO Digest of Statistics - Traffic 1993 - 1997 
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Table 34 Cargo Revenues per Available Tonne Kilometer 
Total 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
Total 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
REVENUE PER REVENUE PER 
CARGO ATK 
BA 
US SCENT 
0.14 
0.13 
0.16 
0.16 
0.15 
USAIR 
US SCENT 
0.05 
0.05 
0.04 
0.04 
0.05 
CARGO ATK 
JAL 
US SCENT 
0.24 
0.00 
0.25 
0.23 
0.25 
| AIR CANADA 
US SCENT 
0.08 
0.09 
0.09 
0.09 
0.09 
REVENUE PER 
CARGO ATK 
LUFTHA 
US SCENT 
0.19 
0.20 
0.22 
0.20 
0.19 
VIRGIN 
US $ CENT 
N/A 
0.07 
0.08 
0.00 
0.09 
REVENUE PER 
CARGO ATK 
SWISSA 
US SCENT 
N/A 
0.22 
0.27 
0.22 
0.16 
DELTA 
US S CENT 
0.00 
0.10 
0.07 
0.06 
0.07 
REVENUE PER 
CARGO ATK 
UAL 
US $ CENT 
0.11 
0.10 
0.10 
0.10 
0.10 
ANA | 
US S CENT 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
0.13 
0.12 
Table 34 evidences the benefits in terms of revenues for those carriers with a 
defined strategy for the cargo business. British Airways, Lufthansa, Japan Airlines, and 
SwissAir all have above average revenues per ATK. United Airlines is expected to show 
the benefits of the investment in its cargo business in the years following 1997. 
Table 35 Cargo Revenue per Cargo Tonne Carried ,84 
Total 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
Total 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
CARGO REVENUE 
TONNE CARRIED 
BA 
USS 
1,292.61 
1,118.92 
1,528.41 
1,568.25 
1,474.22 
USAIR 
USS 
847.65 
875.53 
903.41 
925.27 
984.85 
CARGO REVENUE 
TONNE CARRIED 
JAL 
USS 
1,549.22 
N/A 
1,621.23 
1,492.08 
1,600.27 
DELTA 
USS 
895.80 
1,054.81 
867.51 
832.21 
836.84 
CARGO REVENUE 
TONNE CARRIED 
LUFTHA 
USS 
1,561.06 
1,599.04 
1,806.14 
1,655.69 
1,627.29 
VIRGIN 
USS 
N/A 
1,075.43 
1,175.61 
0.00 
1,379.38 
CARGO REVENUE 
TONNE CARRIED 
SWISSA 
uss 
N/A 
1,400.24 
1,860.94 
1,488.68 
1,446.62 
ANA 
USS 
971.29 
1,078.21 
1,100.17 
992.24 
894.21 
CARGO REVENUE 
TONNE CARRIED 
UAL 
USS 
1,429.72 
1,309.37 
1,430.98 
1,419.71 
627.83 
| AIR CANADA | 
USS 
905.37 
884.58 
1,002.13 
986.21 
934.84 
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Table 35 shows cargo revenues per tonne canied. In this case it is evident that the 
selected caniers with a defined strategy for cargo benefit from higher revenues from that 
operation. By offering value-added services like shipment tracking, Time Definite 
delivery, express customs processing and many others, these caniers are able to capture a 
selected demand of customers who are willing to pay a premium to enjoy the benefits of a 
reliable and expedite logistic solution. 
8.6 Hypothesis Confirmation 
By developing a strategy for the cargo business in a different business unit 
airlines enjoy higher revenues from that business than those carriers with an undefined 
strategy. 
Calculations made from ICAO Digest of Statistics - Traffic 1993 - 1997 
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
• There is an immense potential for the air cargo business over the next ten years that 
should not be ignored by cunent passenger airlines. 
• Passenger airlines that consider the air cargo business as a by-product derive fewer 
revenues from that business as compared to airlines with a defined strategy for cargo. 
• Those carriers considering an investment in the development of a strategy for the air 
cargo business have to evaluate key factors like network, the economics of the 
regions contained in it, and their alliance partners. This will also determine the right 
strategy to adopt. 
• For some carriers to consider the cargo business as a by-product may be the right 
option if after evaluating the key factors at every stage they find out they are in an 
"unfavorable" condition. 
• By having a defined strategy for the cargo business carriers will derive higher 
revenues from that business, increase cargo load factors and improve overall results. 
APPENDIX A 
GLOSSARY 
GLOSSARY 
The source of the definitions is NASA's Aviation System Analysis Capability 
(ASAC) Quick Response System (QRS). 
Air cargo—Subset of total cargo that is transported by aircraft. 
Aircraft miles flown—The great circle distance for each flight stage actually completed, 
whether or not performed in accordance with the scheduled pattern. 
Available load—Represents the maximum salable load. It is the gross takeoff weight 
minus the aircraft empty weight, less the sum of all justifiable aircraft equipment and the 
operating load (consisting of minimum fuel load, oil, flight crew, steward's supplies, 
etc.). 
Available seat mile (ASM)—One available seat transported one mile. Available seat 
miles are computed by multiplying the aircraft miles flown on each flight stage by the 
number of available seats. 
Available ton mile (ATM)—One ton of available load transported one mile. 
Available ton miles are computed by multiplying the aircraft miles flown on each flight 
stage by the tons of available load. 
Available ton miles per departure—Total available ton miles divided by scheduled and 
nonscheduled departures. Available ton miles per departure measures a combination of 
the aircraft size and length of its flight stages. 
Available Tonne Kilometer (ATK)—One Tonne of available load transported one 
kilometer. Available Tonne kilometers are computed by multiplying the aircraft 
kilometers flown on each flight stage by the Tonnes of available load. One avail-able 
Tonne kilometer equals 0.685 available ton miles. 
Average stage length—Total aircraft miles flown divided by the total number of 
departures performed. Average stage length measures the average distance flown 
per flight segment. 
Cargo—Goods transported by ship, aircraft, truck, or other vehicle. 
Cargo available ton miles—One ton of available cargo load transported one mile. 
Cargo available ton miles are computed by subtracting one-tenth of the available seat 
miles (one passenger equals 200 pounds by convention) from the total avail-able ton 
miles. 
Cargo available ton miles per total available ton miles—Cargo available ton miles 
divided by total available ton miles. Ratio measures the percentage of a carrier's traffic 
capacity, by weight, which is reserved for cargo. 
Cargo revenue—Revenue category consisting of scheduled and nonscheduled freight and 
mail revenues. 
Cargo yield—Cargo revenues divided by the sum of scheduled and nonscheduled cargo 
revenue ton miles. Ratio measures the average revenue collected for a ton mile of 
revenue cargo traffic. 
Cargo revenue per total revenue—Cargo revenue divided by the sum of cargo revenue 
and passenger revenue. Ratio measures the percentage of total revenue attributable to 
cargo operations. 
Cargo revenue ton miles—One ton of revenue cargo transported one mile. Cargo 
revenue ton miles are computed by subtracting one-tenth of the available revenue 
passenger miles (one passenger equals 200 pounds by convention) from the total revenue 
ton miles. Equivalently, cargo revenue ton miles are computed as the sum of freight and 
mail revenue ton miles. 
Cargo revenue ton miles per total revenue ton miles—Cargo revenue ton miles divided 
by the sum of cargo and passenger revenue ton miles. Ratio measures, by weight, the 
percentage of total traffic that is attributable to cargo operations. 
Cargo load factor—The sum of scheduled and nonscheduled mail revenue ton miles and 
scheduled and nonscheduled freight revenue ton miles divided by the sum of scheduled 
and nonscheduled cargo available ton miles. 
Direct operating cost (DOC)—A cost category consisting of flight crew costs (salaries, 
benefits, pensions, payroll taxes, and other personnel, professional, and training 
expenses); fuel and oil costs (including taxes); maintenance costs (including maintenance 
overhead); insurance and injuries, loss, and damage charges; aircraft rentals; and flight 
equipment depreciation and amortization charges. 
Flying operations costs—Expenses incuned directly in the in-flight operation of aircraft 
and expenses attached to the holding of aircraft and aircraft operational personnel in 
readiness for assignment to in-flight status. 
Freight—Subset of air cargo that includes all property, other than mail. 
Freight revenue—A revenue category consisting of revenues derived from scheduled 
and nonscheduled freight transportation. 
Freight revenue ton miles—One ton of revenue freight transported one mile. 
Freight revenue ton miles are calculated by multiplying the aircraft miles flown on each 
flight stage by the tons of revenue freight traffic transported on that aircraft. 
Indirect operating cost (IOC)—A cost category consisting of expenses incuned for 
passenger service, aircraft and traffic service, promotion and sales, general and 
administrative, depreciation and amortization of non-flight equipment, and transport 
related costs. 
Passenger load factor—Revenue passenger miles divided by available seat miles. 
Passenger revenue—Revenue category consisting of revenue generated from the 
transportation of passengers by air, including infants transported at reduced fares, 
berth charges, surcharges for premium service, and other passenger-related revenues. 
Passenger weight—For the purpose of Form 41 reporting, a standard weight of 
200 pounds per passenger (including all baggage) is used for all civil operations and 
classes of service. 
Revenue passenger — Person receiving air transportation from the air carrier for which 
remuneration is received by the air carrier. 
Revenue passenger mile (RPM)—One revenue passenger transported one mile. 
Revenue passenger miles are computed by multiplying the aircraft miles flown on each 
flight stage by the number of passengers transported on that aircraft. 
Revenue ton mile (RTM)—One ton of revenue traffic transported one mile. 
Revenue ton miles are computed by multiplying the aircraft miles flown on each 
flight stage by the tons of revenue traffic transported on that aircraft. 
Revenue Tonne kilometer (RTK)—One Tonne of revenue traffic transported one 
kilometer. Revenue Tonne kilometers are computed by multiplying the aircraft 
kilometers flown on each flight stage by the Tonnes of revenue traffic transported on that 
aircraft. One revenue Tonne kilometer equals 0.685 revenue ton miles. 
Scheduled available ton miles per total available ton miles—Total scheduled available 
ton miles divided by the sum of scheduled available ton miles and non-scheduled 
available ton miles. Ratio measures the percentage of a earner's traffic capacity, by 
weight, which is comprised of scheduled service. 
Ton—A short ton (2,000 pounds). 
Tonne—One metric ton (1,000 kilograms). One Tonne equals 1.102 short tons. 
Weight load factor—The sum of scheduled and nonscheduled mail revenue ton miles, 
scheduled and nonscheduled freight revenue ton miles, and one tenth of the 
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